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

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POLAND GERMANY AND THE CORRIDOR

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CASIMIR SMOGORZEWSKI

POLAND GERMANY AND THE CORRIDOR

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INTRODUCTION

THE British public generally takes but little interest in foreign affairs, except in the following cases: first, when there is a question of sentiment, the Englishman is won over beforehand to the cause of the oppressed against the oppressor; secondly, when there is a risk of England becoming entangled in European complications. It is on these characteristics of the British temperament that German propaganda has skilfully played. By the most diverse means it has presented to British public opinion a picture of post-war Europe filled with "injustices" and possible causes of conflict capable of entangling Great Britain in a new war against her will. German propaganda naturally indicates that the German-Polish frontier, "traced for the ambitious satisfaction and 'hegemony' of France", is particularly "unstable", and Englishmen are peculiarly sensitive to the notion of stability.

But they are independent, worship fair play, and bow only to facts. These remarks apply to all European questions, but more particularly to that of the "Corridor".

There is no lack, in Great Britain, of well-intentioned but misinformed persons who consider that the "Corridor" is an anomaly. For example, on December 31, 1927, Mr. Frederick C. Linfield, a former Member of Parliament, wrote in the *Nation and Athenæum* that the "Corridor" is "an economic injustice", and

that this question "poisons the political atmosphere of Europe". Mr. Linfield recognizes that Poland must have a maritime outlet, but he believes that free communication with Danzig through a German corridor would suffice. Unfortunately the facts themselves are sometimes presented in a tendentious manner to British opinion. Such is the case with Sir Robert Donald.

This author, in his book *The Polish Corridor and its Consequences*,[1] defends the German thesis, and he does it with great ability. To all appearances his exposition is impartial, and only an astute reader can detect all his distortions of the truth and all his omissions.

Very prudently Sir Robert has refrained from writing even the shortest historical sketch on the question of Polish Pomerania. His allusions to this are inexact or partial, and are scattered throughout the book. For example, he says that a comparison between Danzig to-day and Danzig under the protection of Polish kings seems to him "fallacious" (p. 131). But it is in no way fallacious, and apart from small differences—differences consequent upon the requirements of modern economic life—conditions are much the same. At the present moment Danzig is in a position very like that which it held before the partitions of Poland. Sir Robert has omitted to say that when first it appeared in history, in A.D. 997, Danzig belonged to Poland, and that during the sub-

[1] Thornton Butterworth, London, 1929.

sequent eight centuries, until 1793, it was only detached from her for an interval of one hundred and forty-six years (1308–1454), when it passed under the domination of the Teutonic Order. He has also omitted to say that the "Corridor" is not a malicious invention on the part of the authors of the Treaty of Versailles, but that, historically, it is a return to the position that existed before 1772.

Sir Robert deems the one hundred and forty-eight years (1772–1920) of the last German occupation in Poland particularly beneficial. He states that during this occupation Pomerania was transformed "from a region of deserts and swamps into rich and fertile lands" (p. 99). It is an incontestable fact that the Germans constructed railways and barracks in their Polish provinces, but when Poland recovered her old territories she paid for all the property Germany had left there.

No German of good faith dare any longer deny that the "Corridor" is ethnographically Polish. Sir Robert is more German than the Germans, and on this matter he apparently knows better than Herr Loebe, the President of the Reichstag. He endeavours to prove that before the war the Poles were in a minority "in East Prussia and the Netze Valley" (p. 22). In this curiously defined territory there were, it appears, 603,821 Germans, 104,474 Kashubes, and 545,846 Poles. Sir Robert is very insistent on the supposed ethnical differences between the Poles and the Kashubes, "the key-people

of the Corridor" (p. 30). Yet it might be thought that the Kashubes, a branch of the Polish people, have to a sufficient degree proved their convictions and aspirations by always sending Polish deputies to the Reichstag during the thirteen legislatures that have sat from 1871 to the outbreak of the war.

So much having been premised, it is important to note that Sir Robert's figures are tendentious, for they refer to a much larger area than the actual "Corridor". In actual fact, not the whole of the old East Prussia has been assigned to Poland, but only the central part.

Sir Robert's arguments on the economic side are as weak as those on the historical or ethnographical. For example, he writes that in 1913 traffic between East Prussia and the rest of the Reich amounted to 632,116 tons by sea and 2,377,524 tons by rail. But what of to-day? The author of the *Polish Corridor* gives no figures; he limits himself to saying that "traffic by rail is slower and the freight higher" (p. 81). What he has not said is that in 1927 traffic by rail between East Prussia and the Reich reached the figure of 4,177,583 tons (that is to say, nearly twice that of the pre-war period) and that—in the words of a German expert—"the rates for transport, fixed according to those of Central Germany, are maintained as though the territory situated between East Prussia and the rest of Germany were still German territory". (Holz: *Ostpreussens Wirtschaft und Verkehr vor und nach dem Krieg*, p. 9.)

With regard to the present situation of Danzig, Sir Robert supports an indefensible thesis. He maintains that before the war Danzig was the "metropolis of the 'Corridor' country", and that its markets have been "dislocated" (p. 132). But in fact they have been disturbed only to such an extent that, thanks to its customs union with Poland, Danzig is the only port in the world that has quadrupled its pre-war traffic (2,134,607 tons of goods were loaded and unloaded in 1912, and 8,485,801 tons in 1928).

The construction of the port of Gdynia on the Polish littoral has in no way harmed the port of Danzig. From zero in 1923, the imports and exports of Gdynia rose to 1,957,348 tons in 1928, though Sir Robert assures us that Gdynia is a "deplorably bad business" (p. 143). Indeed the author approaches the subject with preconceived ideas and no evidence will make him change his opinion.

His solution of these matters may be guessed. He advises Poland to surrender the "Corridor" to Germany, and to be satisfied with facilities for access to the sea across a thenceforward German Corridor (pp. 267–8). Such a "solution" will never be accepted by the Polish nation, for Germany's claims for a fresh annexation of Polish Pomerania are based neither on historical, ethnographical, nor economic grounds, and a substitution of a German corridor for the Polish Corridor would change Poland into German dependency.

We shall give our opinion of this conception later. Here we shall merely quote another British opinion, that of "Augur", an eminent publicist, who writes as follows in his book *Eagles, Black and White* (pp. 118–19):

"The transfer of the 'Corridor' to Germany would not destroy it. It is only turned round, and instead of running from north to south it goes from east to west—a change of adjectives. There would be a real German Corridor instead of an imaginary Polish one. For the map shows that the whole of Poland would be cut off from the open sea by the German protuberance.

"The question therefore must be put: will a German Corridor be more conducive to peace than a Polish one? We look at the map and see that the Polish Corridor is the only outlet to the open sea for a country of more than 30,000,000 inhabitants. The time may come when the sea will be forsaken for the higher air: at present it remains the highway for the world's commerce; free access to it is a boon for any State. So the existence of Great Britain is bound up with the freedom of the seas, and the British are experienced judges on the question. The Polish Corridor separates East Prussia, with a population of about 2,500,000, from the rest of the Reich, but leaves its maritime communications free. A German Corridor would join East Prussia up with the Reich, but would cut off the Polish mass of 30,000,000 from free communication with the

world. On one hand we have a Polish Corridor across the local communications of a province which retains free access to the sea; and on the other, a German Corridor, which stands across the only outlet of a great nation towards the world's maritime routes. Judging objectively, we say that on this point the Polish claim is incomparably stronger than that of Germany."

The Polish people admire the British character, and are grateful to Great Britain for the services which she rendered during the war. These services were concrete, and Mr. Lloyd George signed the declaration of Versailles on June 3, 1918, which stated that "the creation of a Polish State, united and independent, with free access to the sea, constitutes one of the necessary conditions of a lasting and just peace and a lawful régime in Europe". The Poles believe that Poland not only *can* play an important part in the realization of the pacific objects pursued by British policy, but is also firmly determined to *do* so. This is no doubt why *The Times* of February 26, 1927, writes that "a modification of the Polish frontiers should not take place to-day, to-morrow, or ever, for Poland has become a factor of stability for European policy".

POLAND GERMANY AND THE CORRIDOR

CHAPTER I

DANZIG AND THE "CORRIDOR" ARE HISTORICALLY POLISH

Navigare necesse est,
Vivere non necesse. . . .

THE Germans do not cease repeating that the situation arising from the separation of Eastern Prussia from its German Fatherland is "intolerable"; they speak of the "absurd Corridor" and they clamour for the reincorporation of Polish Pomerania in the Reich.

"That which once was German must again become German!" wrote Marshal von Hindenburg.[1]

Poles consider that there exists no "Corridor question", or even a "Corridor" as such. There is, on the one hand, an old Polish province

[1] We have before us a work edited in 1920 by Fr. Zillessen of Berlin. It is entitled: *Was wir verloren haben* (*What We Have Lost*). The following significant words spoken by the present President of the Reich are reproduced in *fac-simile* at the beginning of the book:

"'*Mit wehmutigen Betrachtungen ist die Sache nicht abgethan. War deutsch war muss wieder deutsch werden. Das merke dir, du deutsche Jugend!*'—VON HINDENBURG."

Which means: "One cannot settle a matter by giving way to melancholy thoughts. That which once was German must again become German. Do not forget this, young Germans!"

which has been returned to the rehabilitated Polish State; on the other hand there is the Free City of Danzig, which developed in parallel with ancient Poland, to whom it was always economically united, and which is now similarly united to the new Poland.

The Poles consider that the present Germano-Polish frontiers are just, for within Poland there is not a single district which does not possess a majority of Polish inhabitants. They also consider these frontiers to be reasonable considering the complexity of the ethnographical map of this part of Europe.

The Poles absolutely refuse to "buy neighbourly relations at the cost of a revision of their frontiers". "At no price", says M. Zaleski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, "will Poles give up one inch of Pomeranian territory, which has been Polish for centuries. Pomerania alone assures their free access to the sea." Accordingly, "all Poles would sacrifice their lives and wealth in defence of this territory were any attempt directed against it, no matter from what source".[1]

But Poles never refuse to explain the reasons for their attitude. They are supported by right and good sense, and are therefore not afraid of the world's opinion.

Historical rights played a very small part at the time when the Germano-Polish frontiers

[1] From a speech made on January 10, 1927, on the occasion of the inauguration of the *Society of International Studies* in Warsaw.

were traced. It is, nevertheless, useful to recall the principal arguments which history furnishes for Poland in the matter of Pomerania.

This name of Pomerania—*Pommern* in German—is meaningless if the Polish name of this province is disregarded, namely, *Pomorze*, which signifies "land of the seacoast", or "land emerged from the sea". It is clear that the Polish name is the most ancient. It has a meaning, for it indicates the geographical position of the province in question, and perhaps also its geographical origin.

The same remarks hold good for the names of localities and rivers in Pomerania. Everywhere we find Germanized words of Polish origin. The name of Danzig (*Gdansk*) is itself of Polish origin, as recognized by two German historians, Gottfried Lengnich, in the eighteenth century, and P. Simson, quite recently. "It is absolutely certain", writes the latter, "that Danzig is not a German but a Slavonic name."[1]

At the dawn of history all the territory to the east of the Elbe was inhabited by Slavonic tribes. Ptolemy noted this as far back as the

[1] P. Simson: *Geschichte der Stadt Dantzig*, 1913: "Es steht unzweifelhaft fest, dass Dantzig kein deutscher, sondern ein slawischer Name ist" (Vol. I, p. 12). Indeed, *Gdansk*, which is the Polish name for the town, originates from *ku dana*, two Slav words, "*ku*" meaning *towards* and "*dana*" a primitive name for *water*, which can be found in a number of existing geographical names, such as *Dniepr* (Danapris) or *Dniestr* (Danaster). *Gdansk*, formerly *K'dansko*, was a settlement *by the side of the water*, i.e. on the seacoast.

second century A.D.; and there exists a curious narrative of a voyage made in the Baltic Sea during the ninth century by Wulfstan, an Anglo-Saxon navigator, who sailed from Haedum (Slesvig). He declared that, navigating

along the Baltic coast for seven days and seven nights, he never ceased to have Slavonic populations on his right hand.[1]

The oldest historical record mentioning

[1] The narrative of Wulfstan was inserted by King Alfred the Great in his translation of the chronicle of the Spanish historian, Paul Orosius. See *Script. rer. pruss.*, Vol. I (1861), p. 732.

Danzig is the *Life of Saint Adalbert*,[1] who, in 997, went from Poland to the land of the ancient Prussians so as to preach his gospel and baptize the people. This apostle sailed from Danzig, which, together with all the territory situated on the left bank of the Vistula (that is to say Pomerania), then belonged to the Duke of Poland, Boleslas the Brave. When in 1138, before dying, King Boleslas III divided Poland into several duchies, which he distributed among his sons, the territory surrounding the mouth of the Vistula fell to the lot of the local dynasty.

This did not prevent Pope Eugenius III, in his Bull of April 4, 1148, from entrusting Danzig to the spiritual authority of a Polish bishop, and attaching him to the diocese of Wloclawek, within whose authority the city remained until the beginning of the nineteenth century.[2]

Under the administration of the Slavonic Princes of Pomerania, Danzig was gradually enlarged and transformed owing to the affluence of German settlers who, especially in the thirteenth century, were encouraged in this direction by their princes. The German historian Perlbach states, however, that the affluence of

[1] IOANNES CANAPARIUS: *Vita S. Adalberti*: "Ipse vero adiit primo urbem Gyddanyzc. . . ." This text establishes the pre-Slavonic derivation of the name of Danzig.

[2] This Bull is found in the collection of M. PERLBACH: *Pommerellisches Urkundenbuch*, Danzig, 1881, Doc. No. 2. It may be noted that in 1148 the Pope wrote *Kdansc*.

these colonists did not change the essentially Polish character of the province; Perlbach adds that the policy of Mestwin II, last Duke of Pomerania, was "resolutely Polish".[1] This Prince, who died on December 25, 1294, without issue, left his Duchy to his cousin, Przemyslaw II, Duke of Greater Poland, who was crowned King of Poland in 1295, and was assassinated in the following year by order of the Margrave of Brandebourg. Ladislas the Brief succeeded him and, after a period of disturbance, became King of Poland, which was once again united.

Let us here look back again.

In 1225 Conrad, Duke of Mazovia, appealed to the German Order of the Virgin Mary, known as the *Teutonic Order*, asking that it should shed the light of the Gospel on Prussia and, at the same time, protect his Principality. Poland paid dearly for this act of Conrad's.

In 1308 the Teutonic Order, after having conquered the territory which to-day represents Eastern Prussia, captured Danzig by storm and invaded Polish Pomerania (i.e. the "Corridor" of present days). On November 14th, the Polish population of Danzig and Tczew (Dirschau) was butchered. According to the Danzig historian Löschin, there were ten thousand

[1] M. PERLBACH: *Preussisch-polnische Studien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters*, Halle, 1886: "Mestwin II . . . lenkt in eine entschieden Polnische Politik ein, die darin ihr konsequentes Ende fand, dass der söhnelose Herzog sein Land dem grosspolnischen Vetter hinterliess . . ." (Vol. II. p. 1).

victims.[1] A German general, who wrote the history of Danzig on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the capture of that city by the Prussians, admits the crime and explains it as follows:

"The conduct of the Order with regard to Danzig and Tczew (Dirschau) is only a form of waging warfare according to the Mongolian fashion. . . . Djenghis-Khan acted thus, for he did not have an army sufficiently powerful to leave contingents in the more important cities. In view of the fact that the Order only had a small armed force, it could but adopt the same methods. . . ."[2]

This was the beginning of Danzig's Germanization.

In 1410 Poland defeated the Teutonic Order between Grünwald and Tannenberg, but it nevertheless succeeded in remaining master of Danzig until 1454. Then the complaints of the Pomeranian population, oppressed by the iron hand of the Order, incited the King of Poland, Casimir Jagellon, to incorporate Pomerania and Danzig within Poland; and after the ensuing war, which lasted twelve years,

[1] LÖSCHIN: *Geschichte Danzigs*, 1928, Vol. I, p. 38.

[2] Major-General KÖHLER: *Geschichte der Festung Danzig*, 1893: "Es liegt ein Stück mongolischer Kriegsführung in d. Verfahren d. Ordens gegen d. Städte Danzig und Dirschau. Tchingiskhan verfuhr bei . . . da er nicht mit hinlänglichen Truppen versehen war, d. grossen Städte mit Besatzungen zu versehen. Bei d. geringen Kraften über welche d. Orden gebot, bleib ihm nicht anderes übrig, als ebenso zu Werke zu gehen . . ." (Vol. I, p. 20).

a peace ratifying this restitution was concluded at Thorn on October 9, 1466, between Poland and the Teutonic Order.[1]

In 1525 the Teutonic Order's Grand-Master, Albert von Hohenzollern-Anspach, embraced the Protestant faith, and was followed by the majority of the Order. The Teutonic State, after centuries of existence, became a hereditary monarchy, and the King of Poland, Sigismond I, recognized it on condition that Albert and his successors recognized the sovereignty of Poland. On April 8, 1525, in Cracow, the Hohenzollern swore a solemn oath of vassalage to the King of Poland.

Poland was then strong enough to wipe out the political consequences of Conrad's act, yet this was not done because of the trust placed in Albert's oath and in the treaty signed by him. Many times have Polish historians reproached Sigismond for this excessive confidence.

The city of Danzig, which since 1454 had formed an integral part of Pomerania, remained in Poland's possession until 1793, during the second division of Poland; for although Pomerania was given over to Prussia at the

[1] From 1569 onwards, by virtue of the Royal decree of Sigismond-Auguste, published on March 16th, Polish Pomerania sent Deputies to the Diet of Warsaw in the same way as the other provinces of the Kingdom. It was thus that the signatures of the Pomeranian deputies came to figure at the bottom of the treaty concluded at Lublin on July 1, 1569, consecrating the true Polish-Lithuanian union.

beginning of the division in 1772, the city of Danzig itself remained attached to Poland.[1] Neither the Germans nor the population of Danzig were ever persecuted by Poland because of their nationality, but on the contrary obtained numerous privileges, with the remarkable consequence that from 1454 to 1793 the inhabitants of Danzig were the devoted subjects of Poland. They evidently found this to be in their own interest. At the end of the seventeenth century, Danzig—the only port of Poland—had 77,000 inhabitants and was the most populous city of Central Europe, Hamburg only attaining this figure one hundred years later.

After the signing of the treaty which resulted in the second division of Poland, by virtue of which Danzig was ceded to Prussia, the population rose in arms against the Prussian Army which was taking possession of the city. Prussia did not put forward the German character of the city as an excuse for its occupation. On

[1] In 1772 Frederick the Great endeavoured to seize Danzig. He even occupied the port of Danzig, Neufahrwasser, where he established a maritime custom-house and began to collect taxes from the ships. That honourable patrician of Danzig, Jeanne Schopenhauer, a well-known writer and mother of the famous German philosopher, writes in her *Memoirs* concerning this: "The King of Prussia fell like a vampire on the unfortunate city, and he sucked its vital strength . . ." (J. SCHOPENHAUER: *Jugend und Wanderbilder*, ed. 1884, chap. xi). But Frederick the Great did not achieve his object; he was forced to give up Danzig. It was his successor, Frederick William II, who brought his task to a conclusion.

the contrary, in his declaration of February 24, 1793, Frederick II explained that the occupation of Danzig resulted from the dangerous state of the city, which was hostile to the cause of Prussia and attached to that of Poland, "Not to mention", he added, "the hostile disposition which this city has harboured against Prussia for many years . . .".[1]

In 1807, by the treaty signed at Tilsit on July 7th, Danzig became a Free City. From the autumn of 1808 the garrison of Danzig was composed of two Polish infantry regiments of the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw (founded in 1806). The economic situation of the Free City was not stable, however, owing to the fact that Danzig remained territorially separated from Poland by an artificial Prussian "Corridor", for Danzig's prosperity always has depended on one condition: its union with the Polish State. There was nothing surprising under these circumstances that in 1813 Danzig again aspired towards reincorporation with Poland.

Napoleon had just been defeated in Russia, and the frontiers of Europe were destined once again to be changed. On January 8, 1813, a commission composed of five senators of Danzig (Weichmann, Wernsdorff, Döring, Trendelenburg, and Sörmans) prepared an important secret memorandum for Dr. Keidel, a delegate of the Free City to the "Imperial Government" in Paris. This memorandum opposed Danzig's

[1] G. F. MARTENS: *Recueil des Principaux Traités . . .* Göttingen, Vol. V, p. 444.

return to Prussian dominion as being "a supreme and inadmissible evil"; they viewed the Constitution of 1807 as "undesirable", for it "separated the city from Poland, a powerful and independent State".[1] It was in accordance with these ideas that Keidel attempted to act during the Vienna Congress. The Congress ended, however, with the repartition of Poland among the monarchies which had despoiled her.

But the traditional sympathies of Danzig for Poland still survived when, in Warsaw, on January 8, 1863, the Russian and Prussian Governments concluded their famous secret convention which had as its object the stifling of the insurrection by their joint forces. But the matter leaked out and resulted in grave reproaches directed against the Government of Berlin. On February 18th Bismarck, the head of the Prussian Government, used as his principal argument, in defending his anti-Polish policy before the Tribunal of the Reichstag, the fact that "an independent Poland, in the event of a victorious insurrection in Warsaw, would in all probability claim the port of Danzig".[2] A few days later the British Ambassador, Sir Andrew Buchanan, questioned

[1] SIMON ASKENAZY: *Dantzig et la Pologne*, Paris, F. Alcan, 1919, pp. 118–19.—Keidel immediately left for London, where, in June 1814, he handed to Lord Castlereagh a note saying: "His Britannic Majesty has never recognized Danzig's temporary submission to the Prussian sceptre, effected in 1793 and concluded in 1807. . . ."

[2] BISMARCK: *Reden* (*Speeches*), Vol. II, p. 75.

him personally concerning the secret Convention. Bismarck replied that, with the proclamation in Warsaw of an independent Polish Kingdom, "the first effort of the new State would be to recover Danzig, and that if this attempt proved successful its fatal consequences for Prussia would be only too evident".[1]

Yet it is an extremely characteristic fact that, despite all Bismarck's threats, the Union of Presidents of the Trade Corporations of Danzig published a declaration condemning the Warsaw Convention and Prussia's anti-Polish policy. This protest was published in 1863, regardless of the fact that King Wilhelm I and Queen Augusta were staying in Danzig at the time.[2]

We find particular interest in the opinions expressed by Bismarck on the vital and natural links uniting Danzig to the independent Polish State. Bismarck never changed his views on this question. After his disgrace he expressed himself still more clearly. On September 16, 1894, a deputation of Germans from Posnania came to present its respects to Bismarck in Varzin. The Iron Chancellor, in thanking the deputation, recommended that it "keep on the Warta and on the Vistula a watch even more vigilant than on the Rhine".

"There", he said, "we must not cede a

[1] See FILIPOWICZ: *Confidential Correspondence of the British Government respecting the Insurrection in Poland*, London, 1914; Doc. No. 70.

[2] According to the Buchanan Report of March 1, 1863. See the Collection of FILIPOWICZ, Doc. No. 138.

single inch of land. . . . If a new Polish State were formed it would become the ally of our enemies and would be an active and offensive power until the time when it succeeded in occupying Western Prussia and Danzig."

On September 23, 1894, upon the receipt of a similar German deputation from Western Prussia (Polish Pomerania), Bismarck expressed the essence of his opinions and previsions in the following words:

"If the dreams of Poland ever attain realization, Danzig will be exposed to particular danger. . . . The Poles would necessarily annex Danzig. That city would be the first object of desire for a State having Warsaw as its capital; it would be a vital necessity for the Polish State."[1]

These warnings, prompted by a troubled conscience and evil presentiments (as remarked by the Polish historian Askenazy), have imbued all Prussia's anti-Polish policy, but they were in vain, for in 1920 Danzig became once again a Free City, and the port of a rehabilitated Poland (without any intervening Prussian Corridor!) and Polish Pomerania thus returned to its motherland.

[1] "Wenn das Polnische Phantasiegemälde verwirklich würde, so wäre zunächst Danzig in Gefahr. . . . Die Polen müssten Danzig annektieren. Danzig wäre der erste Objekt der Begehrnichkeit eines Warschauer Staates . . . das Bedurfniss eines polnischer Staates . . ." (BISMARCK, *Reden*, Vol. XIII, p. 104).

One thing should be remembered in considering this brief exposé:

That which the Germans call the "Corridor" of Danzig is not an invention of the authors of the Treaty of Versailles. The "Corridor" always has existed.[1] When Danzig made its first appearance in history in 997, it belonged to Poland; and in the course of the eight ensuing centuries, up to 1793, it was detached from her only for one hundred and forty-six years, during which it passed under the rule of the Teutonic Order; whereas for six hundred and fifty years it formed part of the Polish dominion.

CHAPTER II

POLES HAVE ALWAYS FORMED THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION OF THE "CORRIDOR"

After historical arguments let us give ethnographical ones. Despite the two German annexations (the second one lasted from 1772 to 1920, one hundred and forty-eight years), and despite the systematic and pitiless colonization undertaken since 1886, at a cost to Germany of more than £50,000,000, the population of

[1] Professor F. W. Förster, a well-known German pacifist, made some highly interesting statements as regards Germano-Polish relations to the Polish newspaper *Epoka* in July 1927. The Paris *Avenir* (of July 27, 1927) reproduced these declarations. According to Förster, "the sudden apparition of the 'Corridor' in the midst of German territory" is "infinitely more than a decision of the Treaty of Versailles".

Polish Pomerania, i.e. of the "Corridor", has remained in the majority Polish.

In 1921 there were only 19 per cent. of Germans in the maritime region of Poland. Now they are even fewer, if we exclude the exodus of those Germans who exercised the option for the Reich. In 1921 the *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, an official journal appearing in Berlin, estimated the German population of Poland, following the defining of frontiers, to be 1,363,000. Since then approximately half a million Germans have left Poland. The large majority of these left voluntarily (Poland expelled only 30,000 settlers or optants), for they felt ill at ease without the support of the Prussian Government and the *Ansiedelungskommission* (Commission for Colonization). This exodus did not increase the prestige of the invaders with the autochthons.

We give below a table—based on the official Polish census of September 30, 1921—listing the number of Polish and German inhabitants of eighteen districts in the Province of Pomerania.[1]

[1] According to the *Skorowidz miejscowości Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej: Województwo Pomorskie* (*List of Localities in the Polish Republic: the Province of Pomerania*), Warsaw, General Office of Statistics, 1926, Vol. XI, pp. viii to xi. The census of 1921 showed that there were one million Germans in Poland. Since then approximately one hundred thousand have left. Sigismond Stoliński reckons that in 1927 there were in Poland 884,105 Germans, i.e. 3 per cent. of the total population. The shrinkage of the German minority

District.	Polish.	German.
Puck (Putzig)	24,175 (88 %)	3,738
Wejherowo (Neustadt) ..	39,504 (90 %)	4,119
Kartuzy (Karthaus) ..	59,546 (92 %)	5,037
Koscierzyna (Berent in West Prussia)	40,609 (81 %)	9,290
Chojnice (Konitz)	57,824 (81 %)	13,129
Starogard (Stargard) ..	56,229 (90 %)	5,946
Tczew (Dirschau)	29,283 (82 %)	6,367
Gniew (Mewe)	25,635 (94 %)	1,487
Sepolno (Zempelburg) ..	14,381 (52 %)	13,430
Tuchola (Tuchel)	28,445 (83 %)	5,660
Swiecie (Schwetz)	62,869 (76 %)	20,178
Chelmno (Culm)	33,897 (72 %)	12,872
Grudziadz (Graudenz) ..	55,346 (73 %)	21,401
Torun (Thorn)	76,774 (83 %)	16,175
Wabrzezno (Briesen) ..	32,307 (69 %)	14,678
Lubawa (Löbau)	53,979 (92 %)	4,678
Brodnica (Strassburg in West Prussia)	51,502 (84 %)	9,599
Dzialdowo (Soldau) ..	15,496 (65 %)	8,187
Total	757,801 (81 %)	175,771

Although these figures are in themselves sufficiently enlightening as to the essentially Polish character of the "Corridor", they may nevertheless be confirmed by a fact which will

took place most rapidly in Pomerania, where there were only 90,400 Germans (9·3 per cent.). See S. STOLIŃSKI: *Les Allemands en Pologne*, edited by the Institute for the Study of the Minority Problems, Warsaw, 1927, p. 20.

open the eyes of the most distrustful: the eight districts composing the "Corridor" never, during the period of German occupation and during the thirteen legislatures which took



place between 1871 and 1912,[1] sent a single German Deputy to the Imperial Reichstag, but always and uninterruptedly sent Polish

[1] During this period legislative elections took place in the Reich in 1871, 1874, 1877, 1878, 1881, 1884, 1887, 1890, 1893, 1898, 1903, 1907, and 1912.

Deputies. . . . And this, despite all the political and administrative pressure of the Prussians.

Germans sometimes endeavour to veil this fact by saying: "Not at all! Of the thirteen constituencies in Western Prussia, three only sent Polish deputies to the Reichstag. . . ."

Circumscription.	Polish.	German.	Socialists.
Kartuzy–Puck–Wejherowo	17,344	9,224	316
Koscierzyna–Starogard–Tczew	16,259	10,056	374
Chojnice–Tuchola ..	9,104	6,266	245

Germans thus create a confusion between "Western Prussia" and the "Corridor". Territorially, they are not the same, for all Western Prussia (formerly a German administrative unit) was not given to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles. That which is called the "Corridor" is only the central part of Western Prussia. It is perfectly true that the Poles sent their own deputies to the Reichstag in only three constituencies. But which were these? The first included the districts of Puck (*Putzig* in German), of Wejherowo (*Neustadt* in West Prussia), and Kartuzy (*Karthaus*); the second—those of Koscierzyna (*Berent*), Starogard (*Stargard*), and Tczew (*Dirschau*); the third—those of Chojnice (*Konitz*) and Tuchola (*Tuchel*).

The number of votes given to Polish, German, and Socialist candidates in the preliminary elections in 1912 is given in the table on page 36.

If we refer to the map we see that these eight districts are exactly those which form



the present "Corridor".[1] German arguments merely lead to the rigorous confirmation of the

[1] In 1912 the Poles lost their mandate in the circumscription of Swiecie, although the Polish candidate obtained 8,487 votes, and the German candidate only 8,328. Here the shameful manœuvres of Herr Halem, a *landrat* (subprefect), who was also a candidate, were of a particularly scandalous character.

truth, and as the ethnographical truth is here in favour of Poland, the Germans endeavour to weaken its force by drawing a distinction between the Poles and the Kashubes. It would appear that when the Kashubes (to the north of the "Corridor") and the Poles each speak their native tongue, they are unable to understand each other . . . at least so the Germans affirm. As this allegation has no scientific basis, it deserves but little attention. The Kashubes speak a Polish dialect, and the mountaineers of Zakopane speak another; but an educated man in Warsaw can easily understand both. The Kashubes have never manifested the least desire for separation from the Poles. On the contrary, before the war they even sent Polish deputies to the Reichstag. Their poet, Jarosz Derdowski, most concisely expressed their patriotic feelings in 1885 by giving vent to this couplet:

"No Kashubes without Poland,
No Poles without the Kashubes!"[1]

Two American professors of Harvard Univer-

[1] In a poem entitled *How Sire Czarlinski went to Puck in Quest of Nets* (*Jak Pan Czarliński do Pucka po sece jechol*), we find:

"Niema Kaszub bez Poloni,
A bez Kaszub Polści! . . ."

We advise all travellers to the Polish littoral to visit the village cemeteries and to glance at the inscriptions on the tombs: they are all in Polish. In the cemetery of Oksywia, on the actual seacoast, there lies M. Abraham, a valiant

sity, Charles H. Haskins and Robert H. Lord, territorial experts of the American delegation, write as follows in their book entitled *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*:[1] "Poland needs an access to the sea, but it was not solely because she needed it that she obtained it. The Peace Conference probably would not have satisfied this desire if ethnical reasons had not authorized it to do so. The Conference did not invent the "Corridor": it existed already, and it is clearly inscribed on all honestly compiled linguistical maps. . . ."

We may add that it even existed on the map drawn up in 1913 by a pan-German association, the *Ostmarkenverein* (Union of the Eastern Borders), which forms a very valuable document.

The "Corridor", which always has existed, has at all times been inhabited by an important Polish majority. All impartial Germans recognize as much. Herr Loebe, actually President of the Reichstag, declared on January 16, 1927, at Lodz, in Poland:

"In Germany we protest against the Corridor, yet every one agrees that its population is Polish".[2]

Kashube, who, in 1919, was sent on a delegation to Paris by his countrymen. He was received by President Wilson, to whom he made assurance that all Kashubes felt themselves to be Poles and desired to belong to Poland.

[1] *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, Cambridge, Mass., 1920, p. 153 *et seq.*

[2] See *Lodzer Freie Presse*, January 17, 1927. Herr Loebe is not the only German who expressed the truth in this

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A disciple of Karl Marx could not speak otherwise. The father of Socialism prophesied the restoration of an independent Poland, and on September 6, 1848, he said to the Prussians in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*: "You have devoured the Poles, but you will not succeed in digesting them. . . ."

We shall conclude with three quotations. A member of the British Labour Party, Mr. Hugh Dalton, Member of Parliament—the well-known economist—who visited the "Corridor" in 1926, wrote as follows in his book *Towards the Peace of Nations*: "The so-called 'Corridor' is inhabited by an indisputably Polish population. . . . From the nationalistic viewpoint Poland's position in the 'Corridor' already is very strong, and will become still stronger with every year".[1]

Mr. Isaiah Bowman, the famous American geographer, states in his work, *The New World*, that the population of the "Corridor" is Polish, despite the fact that the Germans had introduced into these regions "the strongest movement of Germanization practised in them for many years".[2]

case. Herr Georg Bernhardt, political director of the *Vossische Zeitung*, declared to a collaborator of the Paris publication *L'Œuvre* (November 1, 1927): "I admit that in this famous corridor there are more Poles than Germans."

[1] HUGH DALTON: *Towards the Peace of Nations*, London, G. Routledge & Sons, 1928. (Pp. 40–1).

[2] See BOWMAN: *The New World*, "Poland and its Disputed Borderlands", Yonkers, N.Y., 1923, p. 328 *et seq.* A well-

Finally, a learned Italian historian and publicist, the late Aurelio Palmieri, who was exceedingly well informed on everything concerning Poland, devoted himself in 1925 to a thorough study of "Polish Pomerania". He expressed the opinion that Pomerania was "historically a Polish land", that "its inhabitants are Poles", and that those who wish to deprive Poland of its maritime coast merely "seek to paralyse its economic life".[1]

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC REASONS FOR THE RESTITUTION OF POMERANIA TO POLAND

A GERMAN scientist, Dr. Ernest Tiesen, writes as follows in his book (*The Treaty of Versailles in Relation to Political Geography*):

"The maritime frontier is of particular importance. Thus it is that, since the development of the maritime movement has become so marked, the extent as well as the favourable situation of a sea-frontier with regard to the

known American publicist, FRANK H. SIMONDS, who conducted an investigation on the spot, came to the conclusion that, by restituting Pomerania to Poland, the authors of the Treaty of Versailles accomplished "an act of mere justice". (See the article: "Pomerania and the Poles", *The New Republic*, New York, August 20, 1924, pp. 362–3.)

[1] "La Pomerania Polacca", *L'Europa Orientale*, Roma, Agosto, 1925, pp. 517–38. Also see PALMIERI, "Danzica e la Polonia", *L'Europa Orientale*, Marzo, 1925, pp. 197–211.

ocean have become vital questions to a powerful State with a large population."[1]

It was precisely for this reason that in 1918 Poland received a promise from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy that she would be guaranteed a free maritime outlet.

On January 8, 1918, President Wilson read, before the United States Congress in Washington, his famous declaration, point 13 of which is as follows:

> "13.—An independent Polish State should be erected; it must include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations to which must be assured *free and secure access to the sea*, and its political and economic independence and historical integrity must be guaranteed by an international covenant."

On June 3, 1918, in Versailles, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando, the Premiers of France, Great Britain, and Italy respectively, published the following declaration:

"The creation of a united and independent Polish State, with free access to the sea, constitutes one of the conditions for a just and lasting peace and the rule of right in Europe."

It was evident that this free access could not be more firmly guaranteed for Poland than by having it pass through Polish territory. The American expert, Robert H. Lord, whom we

[1] *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 1924, p. 211.

have already mentioned, writes as follows in the collected documents published by Colonel House and Mr. Charmes Seymour under the title of *What Really Happened in Paris*:[1]

"Poland's free access to the sea would have appeared far less assured if the lower course of the largest Polish river and the port at its mouth had been left in the hands of Germany. For Germany has always been the principal enemy of Poland."

It was these considerations which prompted the Peace Conference to restore Pomerania to Poland as "ethnographically and historically Polish". As for Danzig, it was established as a Free City, autonomous in its domestic administration; Poland's access to the sea through the port of Danzig was guaranteed by special legislation; and these changes were placed under the protection of the League of Nations.

Poland has an area of 388,000 square kilometres, Germany of 472,000. Poland numbers to-day thirty million inhabitants, Germany sixty-five millions. But whereas Poland's seacoast is barely 73 kilometres in extent (147 if we count the circuit of the Hel Peninsula, which is almost an island), Germany's extends over 1,488 kilometres, of which 498 are on the North Sea, and 990 on the Baltic. Germany has a number of first-class ports—more than sixty—whereas Poland possesses only Danzig (within which she is not even free) and Gdynia. The

[1] *What Really Happened in Paris*, New York, 1921, p. 67 *et seq.*

73 kilometres of the maritime frontier which offer to Poland an access to the Baltic, and through this to the seas of the world, have the same potential quality for Poland as the 1,488 kilometres of the German coast.

M. Eugene Kwiatkowski, Polish Minister of Industry and Commerce, and one of the principal initiators of the port of Gdynia, recently said:

"Let us consider the volume of Poland's trade in 1928. It is estimated that 360 tons of goods were imported or exported per kilometre of our maritime frontier, whereas across our land frontier (extending over 3,744 kilometres) there passed scarcely 12 tons a day. This proves that our maritime frontier is thirty times more active."

The above is an admirable demonstration of the *potential* value of the Polish maritime coast.

And yet Germany has made her campaign against Poland's access to the sea the central point of her policy.

CHAPTER IV

THE FRONTIERS OF THE "CORRIDOR" ARE ECONOMICALLY INVISIBLE

We have shown that in this so-called question of the "Corridor", historical, ethnographical, and economic arguments are all in favour of Poland.

But does Poland selfishly take advantage of the fact that her return to the Baltic coast separates Eastern Prussia from the Reich? In no way; the relations between Eastern Prussia and the rest of Germany are not in the least hindered.

In 1928 Mr. Hugh Dalton, whom we have already quoted above, advised Poland "to facilitate by all possible means the communications across the 'Corridor', as this would considerably disarm the criticisms directed against established frontiers".

Poland anticipated Mr. Dalton's recommendations and has followed this policy since 1921.

On April 21, 1921, M. Casimir Olszowski, in the name of Poland and Danzig, and Herr von Mutius, in the name of Germany, signed a convention on the "liberty of transit between Eastern Prussia and the rest of Germany". Poland has carried out the terms of this Convention since June 1, 1922. At the time of its ratification by the Reichstag, the German Government expressed the fear that the interpretation of this convention might give rise to numerous diagreements which would have to be submitted to the Court of Arbitration. This fear was not justified, however. Transit is carried on to the entire satisfaction of Germany; the frontiers of the "Corridor" are economically invisible, and there are no custom or passport formalities for travellers from Berlin to Königsberg, or vice versa.

On the other hand, the Germans, so as to

create an appearance of difficulties in the "Corridor", very unnecessarily wake travellers in the middle of the night and proceed to an annoying *Passkontrolle*.

A German economist, Dr. Rühl, in a book devoted to the part played by maritime navigation in the foreign trade of the Reich, states that trade between Eastern Prussia and the rest of Germany was effected before the war principally by sea.[1] To-day, despite this terrible "Corridor", most of the traffic, both passenger and commercial, between Eastern Prussia and the Reich, is effected by rail.

This change, amongst others, is due to the eagerness shown by the Polish railway administration to give satisfaction to Germany in the question of transit. The number of trains assuring communications is far more than sufficient for Germany's requirements. Moreover, Poland will meet Germany half-way in all reasonable propositions she may make regarding the questions of transit.

The Germans themselves recognize the efficient organization of this transit. Dr. Holz, a high official in the Reich's railway administration in Königsberg, published, in 1923, a pamphlet entitled *The Economic Life of Eastern Prussia and the Means of Communication Before and Since the War*. In it we read as follows:

"It may be stated . . . with satisfaction that

[1] RÜHL: *Die Nord und Ostseehäfen im deutschen Aussenhandel*, Berlin, 1920, p. 87.

owing to the steps taken by the railway ad-



ministration of the Reich in conjunction with the Polish railway administration, the difficulties

connected with transit have been abolished. *This is why Eastern Prussia, from the standpoint of transit, is not isolated. The Reich railroad has built a bridge across Polish territory.* Transit is effected without the least hindrance, as if the German railway administration held under its own control the traffic crossing through Polish territory. . . . The cost of transportation, established in accordance with the domestic rates of Germany, is maintained as if the territory situated between Eastern Prussia and the rest of Germany were still German territory. It should further be recognized that the Polish railway administration does its best to keep its engagements. . . . That is why the question of the utility of directing the traffic between Eastern Prussia and the Reich, partially or as a whole, across the sea, has lost its reason for existence."[1]

Approximately 600,000 travellers benefit annually by the privileged transit-trains crossing the Polish "Corridor". On the other hand, the number of travellers sailing on the Stettin–Königsberg line, in both directions, only totals

[1] HOLZ: *Ostpreussens Wirtschaft und Verkehr vor und nach dem Kriege*, Königsberg, Gräfe und Unzer, p. 9: "Es kann . . . mit Befriedigung festgestellt werden, dass es den fortgesetzten Bemühungen der deutschen Reichsbahn gelungen ist, im Wege langwieriger Verhändlungen mit den polnischen Bahnen diese Schwierigkeit zu beseitigen. *Für den Durchgangensverkehr ist Ostpreussen kein Enklave mehr. Die Reichsbahn hat die Brücke über das polnische Durchgangsgebiet geschlagen. . . .*"

5,000 per annum.[1] These eloquent figures demonstrate the efficient management of the railway transit across Poland.

CHAPTER V

POLISH TRAFFIC IN THE "CORRIDOR" IS FIVE TIMES GREATER THAN THAT OF GERMANY

ALTHOUGH Germany had the opportunity of fully exploiting the lines running from west to east, the German traffic across the "Corridor" in 1922 was approximately 20 per cent. less than that of Poland going from north to south —that is, from Danzig towards Poland and back. Since then the Polish traffic has increased, despite the persistent, though as a whole very little known, efforts of Germany and Soviet Russia.

On October 3, 1928, *Izvestia*, the official Soviet organ, published a curious article devoted to the problem of Eastern Prussia. "The authors of the Treaty of Versailles", wrote the Moscow paper, "have accomplished, among other abominations, the separation of Eastern Prussia from the rest of Germany." Thus was born a "political problem of unsuspected acuteness" which "disturbs all Europe". According to the *Izvestia* "it is the Germanism of Eastern

[1] STANISLAS SLAWSKI: *Poland's Access to the Sea and the Claims of East Prussia*, edited by Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1925.

Prussia which must be preserved". But by what means?

"If Germany desired to see clearly through the *imbroglio* of Eastern Europe, she would have eyes only for Russia and her potential means of aiding Prussia (who plays so precious a part in the Baltic policy of the Reich) to rise and fulfil her Teutonic mission in Eastern Europe. . . ."

The "potential means" of Soviet Russia are not very extensive, but neither are they contemptible. In the domains of railways and tariffs, German-Soviet collaboration has existed since 1925. Its object is to make all German-Soviet traffic pass through the Polish "Corridor", Eastern Prussia, Lithuania, and Latvia, instead of through Poland herself. The German, Lithuanian, and Russian traffic rate is so calculated that the transportation of goods between the majority of German and Russian centres costs less by this roundabout way, and despite the distance, than through Poland.

Three examples suffice to illustrate this German-Soviet collaboration:[1]

1. The distance between Mannheim and Kharkov through Poland is 2,439 kilometres, and 2,821 kilometres via Lithuania; yet the transportation of one ton of agricultural

[1] CZESLAW LANDSBERG: "On the Subject of Transportation and Transit between Germany and U.S.S.R.", Review *Przemysl i Handel* (*Industry and Commerce*), Warsaw, October 6, 1928, pp. 1642–4.

machinery between these two cities costs $25.41 via Poland, and $21.02 via Lithuania.

2. Nuremberg is separated from Rostov by 2,891 kilometres by way of Poland, and 3,190 kilometres by way of Lithuania; yet the transportation of industrial produce costs $40.42 per ton through Poland and $33.04 through Lithuania.

3. The distance between Hamburg and Moscow is very nearly the same by way of Poland (2,138 kilometres) as through Lithuania (2,133 kilometres), but here again the transportation of a ton of lead through Poland costs $24.57 and through Lithuania $16.34.

It is by this means that Germany has increased her traffic through the Polish "Corridor" in order to reduce the income of Polish railways, and especially to demonstrate the economic importance of the "Corridor" for the Reich.

Has she then succeeded in weakening the economic position of Poland in the "Corridor"? By no means.

The comparative table[1] of the Polish and German traffic in or through the "Corridor" is given on p. 52.

The figures—which only concern the commercial traffic of the railways to the exclusion of fluvial traffic—enable us to draw two conclusions:

[1] This table was kindly communicated to us by Mr. Joseph Sniechowski, Director of the Statistical Bureau of the Polish Ministry of Communications.

1. The German traffic through the "Corridor" does not cease to grow.

2. The Polish traffic of the "Corridor" increases even more rapidly.

The former conclusion proves the efficiency of the Polish railway transit through the "Corridor"; it evinces the good will of Poland, who does everything possible to facilitate German traffic; and, lastly, it shows that the "Corridor" does not hamper Germany economically.

Year.	Polish Traffic.	German Traffic.
	tons	tons
1925	2,850,520	2,083,650
1926	6,747,371	3,316,914
1927	8,619,909	4,177,538
1928	10,600,000	4,200,000 [1]

[1] It should be remembered that in 1923 traffic by rail between Germany and East Prussia amounted to 2,377,524 tons.

The second conclusion politically and economically justifies Pomerania's restitution to her legitimate owner, Poland; politically, because free access to the sea has enabled Poland to withstand the customs "war" declared by Germany in June 1925; economically, because despite combined German-Soviet efforts the Polish traffic in the "Corridor" considerably surpasses that of Germany.

But let us examine these figures more closely. In the first place they only represent railroad



POLISH AND GERMAN TRAFFIC THROUGH THE "CORRIDOR", 1927

The diagram shows the relatively small volume of German trade (black) passing through the "Corridor" as compared with Polish trade (dotted).

The figures indicate volume of traffic in thousands of (metric) tons.

traffic. When we speak of Poland's access to the sea, we cannot disregard her river traffic, although this traffic is not of great importance. Whereas during their occupation the Germans regulated traffic on the lower part of the Vistula, the Russians did nothing to improve navigation on this great Polish river. Poland had so much to do during the first ten years of her independence, with her ruin to be repaired and public buildings to be constructed, that she was forced to forego the vast expense necessary for the improvement of the Vistula.[1]

It is for this reason that river navigation is still comparatively undeveloped in Poland. Nevertheless, in 1927, 2,878 boats or barges transported 703,467 tons of cargo between Poland and the Free City of Danzig.[2] This

[1] One wonders whether Europe is aware of the fact that Poland had 1,837,305 buildings destroyed during the war, for which she has not received a penny of compensation, and that by the end of 1927 she had reconstructed over 82 per cent. of these buildings. Is she aware that since the end of the war Poland has built more than 6,200 schools? Up to January 1, 1928, she had reconstructed more than 1,100 railway bridges, opened 2,000 kilometres of new railway lines for circulation, bought or constructed 1,200 railway engines, 2,000 passenger cars, and 60,000 freight cars, and built 10,000 kilometres of new roads.

[2] According to *Rocznik Statystyki* (*Statistical Year-Book*), Warsaw, 1928, p. 556. In our calculations we have deliberately ignored the river traffic within the interior of the Free City of Danzig. In a propagandist pamphlet, printed in French, English, and German, by the *Jungdeutscher Orden*, and read by August Abel on September 11, 1928, at the International Congress of Ex-Service Men at Luxembourg,

increases the total figure of the Polish traffic between the sea and the interior of the country in 1928 to 11,300,000 tons. But from this figure we must subtract approximately 500,000 tons representing goods which passed through Danzig or Gdynia *en route* for Czechoslovakia and other countries of Central Europe. Thus we obtain in round figures 10,800,000 tons as the amount of Poland's actual traffic in 1928.

Let us now calculate the amount of strictly German traffic, that is to say passing exclusively between Eastern Prussia and the rest of the Reich. The 4,200,000 tons which crossed the "Corridor" in 1928 also represent a large part of the German-Russian, German-Lithuanian, German-Latvian, and German-Esthonian trade. We shall not inflict on our readers too many detailed calculations which each, moreover, can

we find the following: "The total monthly navigation on the Vistula at present is often inferior to that *of one day* in the past!" (*Der "Polnische" Korridor*, pp. 18 and 26.) This statement is false. In 1912, according to official German statistics, 3,769 boats of a total of 775,436 tons descended or ascended the Vistula between Danzig and Warsaw. In 1927 the navigation in the same section of the Polish river amounted to 2,878 boats carrying 703,467 tons of cargo. The *annual* decrease shows only 9 per cent. Poland cannot for the present afford the 5,000,000,000 zlotys needed for the exploitation of all her navigable routes, which extend over approximately 5,000 kilometres. She works gradually. At the present time the Vistula is being deepened between Torun and Warsaw, and a modern river port is in process of construction, and in 1929 the first part of the port, which will include a great lateral canal and two basins, will be completed.

make for himself. Let us only note that by subtracting from the total of the German traffic the amount of goods which crossed the "Corridor" to or from Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Esthonia, we obtain the figure of 2,000,000 tons. This represents the exclusively German traffic across the "Corridor" in 1928, and this figure can alone be compared with the 10,800,000 tons representing Polish traffic.

What do these figures signify? That the Polish traffic in the "Corridor" is more than five times in excess of that of Germany through the "Corridor". They form the most striking economic justification of Pomerania's restitution to Poland.

CHAPTER VI

THERE ARE MANY OTHER "CORRIDORS" IN THE WORLD

THE Polish "Corridor", as has been shown, is not a revengeful invention directed against Germany. But what is very little known is that there exist many other "corridors" in Europe and in America.

We call "corridor" the territory of a country through which it is indispensable that citizens of a neighbouring State should pass if they desire to travel from one point to another of their own national territory by the shortest or most rapid railway route.

We refer to a "half-corridor" when the terri-

torial boundary of a country advances into the possessions of two or more States.

We shall here give some examples of "corridors".

1. When a Dutchman travels by rail from Rotterdam to Terneuzen, a Dutch district situated south of the Scheldt, he is obliged to pass through Antwerp: in fact, he crosses the Belgian "corridor".

2. When you travel from Basel to Schaffhausen, both of them in Switzerland, you must not forget, if you are neither German nor Swiss, to supply yourself with the necessary passports and visas: for you will be crossing the "corridor" of Baden.

3. A Frenchman travelling from Gex (Ain) to visit friends in Annemasse (Haute Savoie) finds that despite the mere 30 kilometres separating him from his destination, he is obliged to pass through Geneva, i.e. to cross the Swiss "corridor".

4. You are visiting the Italian Lakes. From Menaggio, on the bank of the Lago de Como, to Pallanza on the Lago Maggiore, the shortest and most picturesque route is through Lugano. But you will not be able to make this delightful excursion if your passport is not in proper order, for here again you must cross the Swiss "corridor".

5. A Turk travels from Constantinople to Adrianople, both of them Turkish cities; between Sarikeui and Karagach he is obliged to pass through the Greek "corridor".

6. A Lett travels from Riga, his capital, to Libau, a Lettish port on the Baltic Sea; at Mozeikiai (Mozejki) he is forced to cross the Lithuanian "corridor".

7. A Roumanian travelling from Halmei to Sighetut Marmatiei, two Transylvanian towns, has to pass through Hust, which is in Czechoslovakia.

8. On October 30, 1928, MM. Tardieu and Giurati, the French and Italian Ministers of Public Works, inaugurated the Nice–Cuneo–Ventimiglia railway line through the Alps. This line, among its other advantages, allows the inhabitants of Turin and its surroundings to have direct access to the western part of the Italian Riviera. The Italian branch, Cuneo–Ventimiglia, crosses French territory in the Valley of the Roya for 20 kilometres. Thus a new "corridor" has just been created in Europe.

9. A Canadian returns home after a visit to Europe. He lands at St. John, a Canadian port in New Brunswick, and takes his ticket for Ottawa. For more than 200 miles, between MacAdam and Megantic, his Canadian Pacific train crosses the State of Maine (U.S.A.), which forms the American "corridor".

10. A citizen of Buffalo goes to Detroit—both of them large cities in the United States. He takes the New York Central or Michigan Central, or the Grand Trunk, but in all three cases he must travel almost all the way through the province of Ontario, the Canadian "corridor".

11. A Canadian living in Ottawa travels by

the Canadian Northern Railway to Winnipeg. To the south of the Lake of the Woods, between the stations of Baudette and Warroad, he must cross the State of Minnesota, the American "corridor".

12. In the west of the United States, the frontier between the province of British Columbia and the State of Washington follows Latitude 49 North. It is not surprising, under these circumstances, that in this mountainous region an American railway crosses the United States border no less than six times.

13. An American passing from San Diego, in California, to Yuma, in Arizona, by the Southern Pacific Railway, on two occasions crosses Mexican territory.

14. The vast territory of the Belgian Congo is fed from the Atlantic Ocean by a narrow strip of land extending northwards from the mouth of the River Congo. As on either side lies Portuguese territory, we may speak without inaccuracy of the "corridor of the Belgian Congo".

As for "half-corridors", here are some examples:

1. The Dutch Limburg, with Maastricht for centre, separates Belgian Limburg from Rhineland.

2. Austria's access to the Lake of Constance at Bregenz cuts into the direct communications between Switzerland and Bavaria.

3. Finland has twenty-three ports on the Baltic Sea; she nevertheless stood in need of

an outlet to the Arctic Ocean, and obtained it by virtue of the Treaty of Dorpat, signed on February 2, 1920, by which Soviet Russia ceded to her the territory of Petsamo, on the Varanger Fjord. This territory separates Russia from Norway, which countries had until then shared a common frontier.

4. If we glance at the political map of Africa we see that a formidable British "corridor"—composed of an uninterrupted series of protectorates, colonies, mandated territories, or dominions—runs from Cairo to Capetown.

The fact that we point out the existence of all these "corridors" implies no condemnation of any of them. We know only too well that each one is the result of legitimate and indisputable rights. We know very well that the transit through these "corridors" takes place under satisfactory conditions, and that none of the States concerned claims a rectification of these frontiers from its neighbour. Claims are made only in cases when the "corridor" has been too arbitrarily suppressed. Such, for instance, was the case of Bolivia, which had her outlet to the Pacific cut off in 1883.

CHAPTER VII

EASTERN PRUSSIA IS THE ONLY COLONY WHICH HAS BEEN LEFT TO GERMANY

WHEN raising the question of the "Corridor" the Germans at the same time raise the question of Eastern Prussia and of the Free City of

Danzig. As we desire to leave nothing dark, we shall examine these points in turn.

The strained political relations in Eastern Europe result from the following causes: instead of seeking to establish with Poland the bases of a durable agreement, implying no territorial loss to the latter, and constituting a stable foundation for peace, Germany cannot resign herself to the existence of a really independent Polish State. Its rapid development, and the rôle which it is called upon to play, are singularly disturbing to the political hegemony towards which Germany is aiming in Eastern Europe. The logical consequence of these fears is a desire for the suppression of the obstacle by depriving Poland of her outlet to the Baltic. This leads to the question of the "Corridor", so skilfully exploited by German propagandists, and which serves to mask a concrete problem: that of Eastern Prussia.

Unless we accept Poland's division as a precedent establishing a tradition, we must regard Eastern Prussia as having always been a territory surrounded by Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic. Before 1225 not a single German lived there. The autochthonous Prussians (or Borussians) were neither Germans nor Slavs, they were in all probability related to the Lithuanians. Decimated and Germanized by the Teutonic Knights, they gave their name at a later date to the most enterprising branch of the Teutonic race.[1]

[1] ANTOINE MEILLET, a famous French linguist, writes in his book *Les Langues dans l'Europe Nouvelle* (*Languages*

At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the land which is now Eastern Prussia was a very sparsely populated country. The Teutonic Knights lacked manual labour and were obliged to replace the decimated part of the autochthonous population by drawing on volunteer colonists. By reason of their proximity, the most numerous colonists were the Polish peasants who settled in the southern part of the country, on the borders of the Polish frontier. In 1466 the Order was forced to restitute Malbork (*Marienburg*), Elbing, and the province of Warmia (*Ermenland*) to Poland; the rest of Prussia was left as Polish vassal to the Knights.

Until 1772, that is to say until the first division of Poland, Warmia and the rest of Prussia developed along different lines. Warmia was a Polish province, but the Poles only inhabited its southern part, comprising the present districts of Olsztyn (*Allenstein*) and Reszel (*Rössel*); the episcopate and the chapter-house of Olsztyn always remained in the hands of the Poles, which explains the maintenance of the influence of Polish civilization. The

in New Europe), Paris, 1918, pp. 35–6: In the actual province of Eastern Prussia the Germans have more or less assimilated the local population, from whom they have taken everything, their land and even its name. The old Prussian language has not been spoken since the sixteenth century. Eastern Prussia covers a total area of 38,521 square kilometres and numbers 2,256,000 inhabitants, i.e. it is the size of the Netherlands, with a population three times less dense.

remainder of Prussia continued in a state of vassalage to the Teutonic Order, which, in 1525, was secularized and adopted the Protestant faith. The Polish peasants of the present-day districts of Nidbork (*Neidenburg*), Szczytno (*Ortelsburg*), Zadzbork (*Sensburg*), Lec (*Lötzen*), Jansbork (*Johannisburg*), Elk (*Lyck*), Olecko (*Oletzko*), and Ostroda (*Osterode*) were obliged to follow their masters' example and were converted to Protestantism.

In 1618 King Sigismond III of Poland, unable to foresee the subsequent results of his act, gave Prussia (then called "Ducal", since the Grand-Master of the Order had become a Duke) to the Crown of Poland. Later, in 1657, by reason of foreign difficulties, King John Casimir of Poland exempted the Elector from his submission to Ducal Prussia. In 1701 the Electorate of Brandenburg became the Kingdom of Prussia, and it was this kingdom which took the initiative in dividing Poland.

Despite all these historical vicissitudes, the Polish population of Eastern Prussia (Catholic within the region of Allenstein, Protestant beyond) retained its maternal language. This is shown even by the statistics derived from the Prussian general census of 1910, in spite of their very one-sided tendencies. In the regency of Allenstein (*Olsztyn*), a southern district of East Prussia there were, as is made evident by Prussian scholastic statistics, 385,000 Poles (called *Mazures* by the Prussian authorities), and 158,000 Germans, i.e. 70 per cent. of Poles.

Unfortunately these peasants were not duly conscious of their Polish nationality at the time of the declaration of the World War.

At the Peace Conference Poland laid claim to the southern part of Eastern Prussia by virtue of the principle of nationality. But at the request of Mr. Lloyd George the destiny of the Poles inhabiting Eastern Prussia was decided by plebiscite. This plebiscite took place on July 11, 1920; that is to say, while the Polish-Soviet war was at its height, and at the time of the Red Army's rapid advance towards the West. The Germans took advantage of this for their propaganda.

The plebiscite, moreover, was grotesque. In a territory as vast as the half of Belgium, the two inter-allied commissions—presided over respectively by an Englishman (E. R. Rennie) for the regency of Allenstein, and by an Italian (Angelo Pavia) for the sector of Marienwerder (*Kwidzyn*)—had only 1,600 soldiers to ensure freedom of vote, and these were insufficient. Moreover, the commissions, which seemed to be pressed for time, tolerated within the plebiscite territory a German *Sicherheitswehr* which terrorized the Polish population. Under these circumstances there was nothing surprising in the fact that the plebiscite resulted in favour of Germany.

The Polish Government protested beforehand against the plebiscite by informing the inter-allied commission of Allenstein, on July 10th, that in view of the lack of the most elementary

guarantees, and of strong pressure on the part of the German authorities, "the plebiscite would not be the true expression of the population's wishes and would therefore be contrary to the spirit of the Treaty of Versailles".

Germany did not cease to practise terrorism in the ethnographically Polish districts even after the plebiscite. The few leaders of the Polish movement in Eastern Prussia were obliged either to emigrate to Poland . . . or to adapt themselves. And the German census of 1925 found in Eastern Prussia only 103,074 persons who dared to declare the Polish language as being their *Muttersprache*, or maternal tongue.

Such, in brief, is the story of Eastern Prussia. The Germans readily forget that the only period during which this old Teutonic Colony formed part of the Reich coincided exactly with Poland's eclipse as an independent State.

CHAPTER VIII

THE POSITION OF EASTERN PRUSSIA IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMMERCIAL TREATY BETWEEN GERMANY AND POLAND

THE Germans created a special vocabulary to describe the alleged irrationality of the Polish-German frontiers. They introduced the term "Polish Corridor"; they speak of the "insular situation" (*insulare Lage*), unique of its kind, of Eastern Prussia; they complain of the "stifling" (*Abschnürrung*) of this province.

But it is not true that the position of Eastern Prussia is unique of its kind.

1. The city of Zara, with its surroundings, was ceded to Italy by Yugoslavia in accordance with the Treaty of Rapallo of November 12, 1920. This coastal town, surrounded on the continental side exclusively by Yugoslavian territory, and separated from Fiume, the nearest Italian port, by a distance of 150 kilometres, is condemned to hold communication with Italy only by sea, for it possesses no railway connections with that country.

2. Since the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, and especially since the Pact of December 3, 1926, which determined the Ulster-Free State border, the situation of Ulster with regard to England may be compared to that of Eastern Prussia with regard to Germany.

3. Outside of Europe we find Alaska, which is American, separated from the United States by Canadian territory; yet no American ever has had the idea of demanding a Pacific littoral from Canada so that Alaska might communicate with the United States by land.

4. The Republic of Panama is cut into two more or less equal parts by the "Panama Canal Zone", which belongs to the United States, and has an area of 1,365 square kilometres, with a population of 23,000 inhabitants.

Viewing the matter from yet another angle, we may state that the situation of Eastern Prussia, which is only a thinly populated German province, is far more favourable than

SOME SITUATIONS ANALOGOUS TO THAT OF EASTERN PRUSSIA

(1) Alaska and the U.S.A. (2) The Panama Canal Zone. (3) Zara and Italy

that of Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary, all of them independent States, which have no sea-coast of their own and which, as a result, are forced to use foreign ports. Eastern Prussia has fewer inhabitants than Switzerland, the smallest of the four above-mentioned States, yet she possesses her own littoral and her own ports; and a country abutting on the sea cannot speak of being "stifled".[1]

Poland, on the other hand, inevitably would be "stifled" if she were deprived of her territorial access to the sea. Some people question this, quoting the examples of Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, etc. But these examples are not applicable. Switzerland has four or five issues, for Marseilles, Genoa, Hamburg, Rotterdam, and Antwerp compete for her traffic. Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary find themselves in analogous situations, but Germany is obliging with regard to all these clients because they can be served elsewhere; Poland, however, has no choice. Her geographical position forces her to utilize the port of Danzig. This immediately becomes evident on looking at a map.

On the other hand, it is indisputable that the economic situation of Eastern Prussia is difficult. But the cause of her difficulties does not lie in the existence of the "Corridor", but in the

[1] The sea is not a frontier. Corsica is not "stifled" because it is separated by an eight-hour journey from Marseilles. Sardinia and Sicily are not "stifled" either. Japan and, to a certain extent, Denmark are insular States, and they are prospering as well as States with unbroken frontiers.

absence of a Germano-Polish commercial treaty. Right back in 1919 the difficulties of Eastern Prussia were analysed and foreseen by a German economist, Dr. Fritz Simon, an official of the Königsberg Chamber of Commerce, whose conclusions were as follows:

"Although it is not an attractive thought to Prussians, the idea of a Customs Union of Eastern Prussia with Poland imposes itself as a necessity. Indeed Eastern Prussia would, thanks to such a union, enjoy all the facilities offered by commercial relations with Poland and Germany and neighbouring countries, and would thus abolish all inconveniences resulting for this province from its incorporation in the economic system of the Reich. On the other hand, it would be to the interest of Poland to aid the economic development of Königsberg without directing all her efforts towards Danzig. And it is only by being economically strong that Eastern Prussia will be able to maintain her political union with Germany. . . ."[1]

[1] Quoted by PRUTENUS in an interesting article entitled "The Problem of Eastern Prussia in the Light of the Laws of Nature", *Przeglad Polityczny* (*Political Review*), Warsaw, January–February, 1928, p. 29.—Despite the customs war between Germany and Poland, the commercial relations between Eastern Prussia and Poland grow steadily. The total value of Polish imports from Germany decreased, between 1923 and 1927, from 487 to 428 million gold francs; but the imports of Eastern Prussia increased from 2,300,000 to 6,600,000 gold francs (286 per cent.). Meanwhile the Polish exports to Germany fell, within the same period, from 604 million to 467 million gold francs; yet

It would doubtless be utopian to expect the Reich suddenly to wheel round from its actual political stand and to adopt such a proposal. The best solution would be the conclusion of a customs agreement, in the form of a commercial treaty between Germany and Poland, which, without bearing the least prejudice to the present status of Eastern Prussia, would stabilize the political and economic relations of Eastern Europe and would be the surest guarantee of peace.

When we state that the economic prosperity of Eastern Prussia is dependent chiefly on the Polish *Hinterland*, we run the risk of being accused of Imperialism. Yet we have geographical considerations in our favour. The Rhineland is undoubtedly the *Hinterland* of Antwerp and Rotterdam, yet this leads to no demand for annexation. The need for an intelligent and sane policy based on an economic understanding is the conclusion to be drawn. Instead of this, what has the Reich done? It has adopted a negative and sterile attitude and spends hundreds of millions of marks in various *Sofortprogramme* or *Hilfsprogramme* for the purpose of defending Germanism in Eastern Prussia. This policy does not, however, seem to be giving the hoped-for results.

Polish exports in Eastern Prussia increased from 10,500,000 to 52,000,000, i.e. an increase of 496 per cent. Economic necessity proves stronger than the pressure of politics! We may add in this connection that Article 82 of the German Constitution of Weimar authorizes the entrance of a German province into the foreign *Zollverein*.

CHAPTER IX

THE FUTURE PROSPERITY OF DANZIG LIES IN ITS UNION WITH POLAND

By virtue of Article 100 of the *Treaty of Versailles*, Germany renounced "in favour of the principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and claims" on the city and the territory of Danzig. It was accordingly these Powers which administered the affairs of Danzig from the time of its evacuation by the German troops (January 24, 1920) until its establishment as a Free City (November 15, 1920). Article 102 of the Treaty states that the Free City "is placed under the protection of the League of Nations", and by virtue of Article 103, the constitution of the Free City "will be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations". The League of Nations is represented in Danzig by a resident High Commissioner;[1] it is his duty "to arbitrate in the first instance on all disagreements likely to arise between Poland and the Free City".

[1] The following is a list of High Commissioners of the League of Nations in Danzig: Sir Reginald Tower, British (Jan. 9, 1920–Nov. 15, 1920); Colonel Strutt, British (Nov. 16, 1920–Dec. 15, 1920); Signor Bernando Attolico, Italian (Dec. 16, 1920–Jan. 23, 1921); General Sir Richard Haking, British (Jan. 24, 1921–Dec. 31, 1922); Mr. MacDonnell, British (Jan. 1, 1923–Feb. 28, 1926); Mr. van Hamel, Dutch, who took office on March 1, 1926, and whose mandate expired on June 21, 1929. The League of Nations has appointed as his successor Count Manfredi Gravina, an Italian, whose mandate began on June 22, 1929, and lasts for three years.

Danzig is not a sovereign State or even a State at all. Constituted as a Free City in accordance with a treaty to which it was foreign, depending on the League of Nations for its domestic affairs and on Poland for its foreign affairs, Danzig—following the shrewd expression of Viscount Ishii, the Japanese delegate and first reporter on questions concerning the Free City—is nothing but a "community" "On the territory of the Free City, nobody except Poland can claim even limited rights of sovereignty. It is true that Poland does not possess the Free City within her political frontiers. But, on the other hand, she is the only *State* that has claims on the territory of Danzig. . . ." Thus it is that M. A. de Lapradelle, a jurisconsult and an eminent Professor of the Faculty of Law in Paris, describes the relationship between Danzig and Poland.[1] Poland is represented in Danzig by a Commissioner-General.[2]

What, then, are Poland's rights over Danzig? By the terms of Article 104 of the *Treaty of Versailles*, Poland and the Free City of Danzig were to conclude a convention with a view:

"(1) To effect the inclusion of the Free City of Danzig within the Polish Customs frontiers, and to establish a free area in the port;

[1] See the *Messager Polonais* (Warsaw), April 1, 1925.

[2] This post is at present held by Henri Strasburger, a former Minister of Industry and Commerce. He had two predecessors in Danzig: Matthew Biesiadecki (1920) and Leon Plucinski (1921–23).

"(2) To ensure to Poland, without any restriction, the free use and service of all waterways, docks, basins, wharves, and other works within the territory of the Free City which are necessary to Polish trade;

"(3) To ensure to Poland the control and administration of the Vistula and of the whole railway system within the Free City, except such street and other railways as primarily serve the needs of the Free City; and of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communication between Poland and the port of Danzig;

"(4) To ensure to Poland the right of developing and improving the waterways, docks, basins, wharves, railways, and other works and means of communication mentioned in this Article, as well as to lease or purchase, by appropriate means, such land and other property as may be necessary for these purposes;

"(5) To provide against any discrimination within the Free City of Danzig to the detriment of Polish citizens and other persons of Polish origin or speech;

"(6) To provide that the Polish Government shall undertake the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free City of Danzig as well as the diplomatic protection of its citizens when abroad."

This Convention was to be negotiated by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, and approved by the Conference of Ambassadors; it was signed on November 9, 1920, by Paderewski in the name of Poland, and by Heinrich

Sahm in the name of Danzig. On many points the Convention introduced, to Poland's detriment, restrictions to the clauses of the Treaty. For instance, it created a Port and Navigation Council which had not been provided for in the Treaty.[1]

On October 24, 1921, in Warsaw, the delegates of Poland and of the Free City signed another very detailed convention which developed and rendered more precise the stipulations of the Paris Convention.

If formulas could suffice, Poland would have reason to be satisfied. But it is necessary to examine the manner in which these conventions are put into execution. Following the adoption of the Free City's constitution, Poland stumbled against the resistance and even the ill-will of the Danzig Senate, presided over, just after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, by Heinrich Sahm, Chief of the German Police in Warsaw during the war.

By virtue of the stipulations contained in the Danzig Constitution, the Free City is governed by a Senate of two component parts: there are eight Senators in "principal office" (*Hauptamt*), and fourteen Senators in "secondary office" (*Nebenamt*); the former are appointed for four years, the latter are parliamentarians and are

[1] The Port Council is composed of five Poles and five citizens of Danzig; it is presided over by a Swiss; its first President was Colonel James de Reynier (April 12, 1921–Feb. 28, 1925); and his place is now held by Colonel Hugues de Loës.

responsible to a *Volkstag* of one hundred and twenty deputies. Until the last elections (November 13, 1927), both sections of the Senate were almost exclusively composed of Nationalists. But a movement towards the Left having manifested itself in the electorate in January 1928, a Democratic Senate assumed power in the Free City.

It is still Herr Sahm who presides over it, but it was a new Sahm who presented himself at the *Volkstag* sitting of January 26, 1928. For the first time since the establishment of the Free City, the relations between Poland and Danzig held their legitimate place in the President's report. Herr Sahm laid stress in his speech on the fact that the new Senate would exert its efforts "to draw closer the links binding the Free City to the Polish Republic in order to satisfy the economic needs of both countries". He announced that henceforward "the negotiations between the Free City and Poland would have to be carried on in a spirit of conciliation and, if possible, directly"; it was only "exceptionally" that matters of disagreement between Poland and Danzig would be submitted to the League of Nations.

Thanks to this change the relations between Poland and the Free City have become less strained, and recourse to the League of Nations is more infrequent, whereas some years ago there existed a régime of permanent arbitration between Warsaw, Danzig, and Geneva. Since the last elections in Danzig, however, decisions,

recommendations, appeals, and notifications have grown rare.

This is a source of considerable annoyance to the sowers of discord and those who believe that the more strained the situation becomes the greater will be their advantage. They have just published in Eastern Prussia an anonymous pamphlet entitled *Danzig am Abgrund* (*Danzig on the Edge of a Precipice*). This is a valuable document, for its author discloses the strings which are pulled in the German agitation concerning the "Corridor". It considers the new procedure to be applied to possible disagreements between Poland and Danzig as being "extremely regrettable", for "through this change one has lost one of the most efficient ways of constantly showing the abnormal and unbearable character of the situation in Danzig, as well as on the Polish-German frontier as a whole". The pan-Germanist author states that "unfortunately this method of solving disagreements finds partisans within the Danzig Government, with the Socialists, and in certain economic spheres". And he continues, "The elimination of Danzig from the influence of Geneva constitutes an important success for Poland's foreign policy. Of course, this will weaken the interest which the world's press finds in Polish-German affairs and, above all, in the question of the 'Corridor'. . . ."

We understand full well the anxiety of this pan-Germanist. But we have confidence. The economic collaboration of Poland and the Free

City is built on foundations that are too deep to be shaken by temporary circumstances.

CHAPTER X

THANKS TO POLAND DANZIG IS THE ONLY PORT IN THE WORLD WHICH HAS QUADRUPLED ITS PRE-WAR TRAFFIC

WHEREAS the shipping in the ports of Stettin and Königsberg has fallen off since the war,[1] that of the port of Danzig has increased enormously. To what is this due? It is because 31 per cent. of Poland's entire commercial traffic passes through Danzig, and 95 per cent. of the goods imported or exported by way of this port are destined for, or come from, Poland.

During the first years of the new régime the call of nationalism was so strong that the inhabitants of Danzig, in spite of this extension of their field of activity, were loath to consider these results as sufficient compensation for the

[1] According to *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, shipping in the port of Stettin, which in 1913 totalled 2,012,500 tons, only attained 1,614,000 tons in 1925. For Königsberg the corresponding figures are 646,000 and 574,000 tons. Assuming the total traffic of the ports of Danzig, Gdynia, Königsberg, and Memel to be represented by the figure 100, in 1927 this shipping would have been divided between these four ports in the proportion of 73, 8, 11, and 9 respectively; in 1913 the relative traffic of Danzig, Königsberg, and Memel (Gdynia did not exist) would have been expressed by the figures 49, 35, 16. These figures are self-explanatory.

close bond that would henceforth link them to Poland. Yet a change may be noted. Dr. Werner Mahrholz recently devoted to the question of Danzig (a question different from, yet closely linked to, that of the "Corridor") an interesting article in the *Vossische Zeitung* (August 19, 1928). He states that the inhabitants of Danzig are at heart German, but that they realize that "apart from Poland they would have no economic existence".

The growth of the traffic in the port of Danzig is illustrated by the following table of combined arrivals and departures:

Year.	Ships.	Tons.
1912	5,966	1,963,805
1922	5,409	2,851,949
1923	5,786	3,412,180
1924	6,642	3,283,033
1925	7,944	3,735,162
1926	11,870	6,828,320
1927	13,892	7,832,431
1928	12,381	8,071,836

As may be seen, the traffic in 1928 was four times greater than in 1912, which was the most favourable year for Danzig before the war.

In order to weaken the eloquent testimony of these figures, Germans object that ships entering or leaving the port of Danzig are not always loaded. We shall therefore reply to this

with official figures from the Council of the Port and Waterways of Danzig, an organization composed of five Poles and five citizens of Danzig, with a Swiss, Mr. de Loës, as President. In the following table there will be no question of the tonnage of vessels, but only of cargoes loaded or unloaded in the port of Danzig. Here are the post-war figures as compared to the pre-war ones:

Year.	Imports.	Exports.	Totals.
1912	1,141,455	933,152	2,134,607
1922	466,287	1,428,828	1,895,107
1923	654,929	1,062,863	1,717,792
1924	738,071	1,636,485	2,374,556
1925	690,778	2,031,969	2,722,747
1926	640,695	5,659,605	6,300,300
1927	1,517,194	6,380,419	7,897,613
1928	1,730,642	6,755,159	8,485,801

These figures make evident the fact that shipments through the port of Danzig increased by 400 per cent. between 1912 and 1928. Meanwhile the number of regular steamship lines serving Danzig increased in proportion, and at the present time there are seventy lines connecting Danzig with all the principal ports of the world. The number of countries thus represented by their ships rose from eleven in 1912 to twenty-seven in 1927.

Characteristically enough it is the German

flag which, in statistics of tonnage arranged according to nationality, occupies the first place (26 per cent.). Germany is followed by Sweden (22 per cent.), Denmark (20 per cent.), and Great Britain (10 per cent.).

The port of Danzig, after its incorporation within the economic organization of Poland, has been changed from the provincial third-grade port which it was before the war into one of the principal ports of the Baltic and Northern Seas. Its traffic to-day is superior to that of Göteborg, Malmö, Stettin, Leningrad, Lübeck, Reval, Königsberg, Riga, Memel, etc., and, judged by the volume of goods it handles, is inferior only to Hambourg, Bremen, Copenhagen, and Stockholm.

It is clear that the future prosperity of Danzig depends upon its union with Poland.

CHAPTER XI

THE PORT OF DANZIG IS NO LONGER SUFFICIENT FOR POLISH TRADE: THE PORT OF GDYNIA WILL SUPPLEMENT IT

THE development of Poland's economic life and the increase of her population enable us to foresee continual growth for Polish maritime traffic. This explains the construction of the port of Gdynia, which is not destined to compete with Danzig, but the building of which is based on the optimism, founded on experience, which is felt by the Polish Govern-

ment. Indeed, statistics prove that the two ports will hardly meet the needs of Poland's economic growth.

The construction of the port of Gdynia (an ancient fishing village situated within the Bay of Danzig, but on the Polish portion of the coast) was started in February 1920. It was as

recently as September 23, 1922, that Parliament authorized the Polish Government to undertake the construction of a modern port at Gdynia. This port was inaugurated on April 29, 1923, in the presence of the President of the Republic and representatives of the British, French, and Esthonian Navies. In 1924 it became possible actively to push forward the work,[1] and a

[1] In accordance with an agreement concluded on July 4th between the Polish Government, on the one hand, and a Franco-Polish consortium representing the *Société de Con-*

traveller now arriving in Gdynia will see that an entire city has sprung up, American-fashion, in the course of a few years.[1]

The port of Gdynia is far from being completed, but its traffic is developing. Here are the figures relating to it growth:

Year.	Ships.	Tons.
1924	54	81,232
1925	164	146,162
1926	601	412,951
1927	1,080	824,842
1928	2,201	1,997,795

And the following are statistics of shipments through the port of Gdynia:

Year.	Imports.	Exports.	Totals.
1924	631	9,086	9,717
1925	1,646	49,743	51,389
1926	178	410,297	410,475
1927	6,702	891,497	898,199
1928	190,962	1,766,386	1,957,348

struction de Batignolles, *Schneider et Cie*, the *Sté. Anonyme Hersent* and the *Polski Bank Przemyslowy* (Polish Industrial Bank of Lwow) on the other. This agreement was modified on July 2, 1926. Up to January 1, 1928, 16,469,632 zlotys were expended on the construction of the port of Gdynia.

[1] Gdynia, which had 8,000 inhabitants in 1927, numbered 28,000 in 1929.

As seen above, the traffic of the port of Gdynia is increasing rapidly. This may be noted especially in connection with exports owing to the concentration of effort which has been made over the development of the export trade in coal. Coal is the principal export from Gdynia; and growth in the exportation of other products will be possible only after the fitting-up of the quays at the entrance of the interior basin, and the construction of warehouses, which is to say not before 1929. When the first series of improvements is completed (in 1931), the port of Gdynia will be able to export one million tons of coal and 367,000 tons of other goods per month, and it will be able to import 157,000 tons of goods within the same period.

Poland, while constructing her own port of Gdynia, does not forget Danzig. In July 1927, at Poland's instigation, the Council of the Port of Danzig floated a foreign loan of twenty million Danzig florins for the purpose of enlarging the port. The loan is guaranteed by Poland, and this fact clearly shows that the Polish Government has no intention of "boycotting" Danzig. Two ports are none too many for a large country.[1]

Certain Germans, Herr Arnold Rechberg, for

[1] In May 1926 Tczew (Dirschau) began to function as a seaport. Prior to that it was exclusively a river-port. It is situated on the Vistula, above Danzig, on Polish territory. In 1927 183 salt-water craft shipped 120,000 tons of coal from Tczew.

example, suggested the following "solution" of the problem of the "Corridor": that Poland should cede this Polish territory to Germany and receive "in exchange" Lithuania, with her port of Memel.[1] This "solution", however, is absolutely impracticable. Apart from political and moral reasons against its adoption, it is apparently forgotten that Memel is a small, sandy port, whose capacity does not equal that of Gdynia in its present state! In 1927 the traffic of the port of Memel amounted to 1,656 ships and 858,900 tons.

CHAPTER XII

THE BIRTH OF THE POLISH NAVY

POLAND'S foreign trade in 1924 amounted to 18 million tons and represented 3,000 million zlotys in value; in 1928 it attained 26 million tons and a value of 5,400 million zlotys. Among the principal exporters to Poland we find Germany (25 per cent.), the United States (12 per cent.), Great Britain (10 per cent.), and

[1] This idea was introduced by the German Press in 1926. The *Berliner Börsen-Courier*, December 17, 1926, published an article entitled "Was wird mit Litauen?" Here is its conclusion: "The division of Lithuania would facilitate the solution of certain eastern questions, for example that of the Polish Corridor." The *Hamburger Nachrichten*, December 31, 1926, wrote as follows: "Peace in the East can only be assured by the suppression of Lithuania. Indeed, this State, whose existence is worthy of a comic opera scene, stands in the way of a Germano-Polish understanding. . . ."

France (7 per cent.), while her chief buyers are Germany (32 per cent.), Great Britain (12 per cent.), Austria (11 per cent.), and Czechoslovakia (10 per cent.).

Although in 1924 barely 13 per cent. of Poland's trade was carried by sea, in 1928 approximately 40 per cent. of it passed through Danzig and Gdynia; and whereas in 1924 Poland had to all intents no merchant navy, in 1928 4 per cent. of Poland's maritime trade was carried under the Polish flag.

A merchant navy cannot be created in a day: freight and capital and experience are needed. A few Polish private companies which did not possess all these requisites were placed in great difficulties between 1921 and 1925. But in 1926 the Polish Government took interest in the matter. Eugene Kwiatkowski, Minister of Industry and Commerce, evolved a systematic plan for the organization of the first important steamship company. It is thus that the *Zegluga Polska* (Polish Navigation Company) was created, with M. Julian Rummel, a former President of the Polish Maritime and Fluvial League, as Director.

The *Zegluga Polska* bought its first five cargo-boats, of 3,000 tons each (the *Torun*, *Poznan*, *Katowice*, *Krakow*, and *Wilno*), from the *Chantiers Navals Français* of Caen, and started regular services in the autumn of 1926. In 1927 the company's ships carried 308,000 tons, and in 1928 more than 450,000 tons, of merchandise.

In 1927 the *Zegluga Polska* bought back the

transport *Warta*, of 4,200 tons, from the Polish military authorities, and took delivery of two cargo-boats of 5,000 tons each (the *Wisla* and the *Niemen*) which had been specially constructed for it by the British firm of Craig, Taylor, and Co., of Stockton. As the *Zegluga* has, besides these, a small cargo-boat of 1,000 tons (the *Tczew*) and five passenger-ships which are used for Baltic cruises, its fleet on January 1st last totalled 14 units of a total capacity of 32,000 tons.

Further, the *Zegluga* collaborates with a French steamship company, the *Chargeurs Réunis*, in running a regular line between Poland and South America. Two ships, the *Krakus* and the *Swiatowid*, of 11,000 tons each, serve this line, and for the present fly the French colours. The first departure from Gdynia for Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires took place on September 9, 1928, and now ships sail regularly every six weeks. The Polish Government has guaranteed the company a minimum of 4,000 emigrants per annum, and at the end of three years the *Zegluga* will be able to buy back the line.

Quite recently, also, the *Zegluga* created a "Polish-British Steamship Company" (*Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okretowe*). This is an Anglo-Polish company with a capital of £310,000; the British partner, the *Ellermann Wilson Line*, holds 25 per cent. of the capital, and supplies four fast ships capable of carrying five hundred passengers as well as perishable

goods. The "Polish-British" Company, with its four vessels of a total capacity of 10,800 tons, will ensure regular maritime communications between Gdynia, London, and Hull.

There further exists a "Polish-Scandinavian Transportation Company" (*Polsko-Skandynawskie Towarzystwo Transportowe*), with Gdynia as its port, and its three cargo-boats total 4,200 tons capacity. In 1928 the Polish-Scandinavian Company carried 140,000 tons of goods, and its fleet will soon be the richer by two cargo-boats of 3,000 tons each, which are at present under construction in the Motala shipyards in Göteborg, Sweden.

Now let us turn to the Polish Navy. Its only duty is to defend the Polish coast in case of need, and it consists of two gunboats, six small destroyers, and four trawlers. These twelve vessels carry in all twelve guns of 76 mm. and sixteen of 47 mm. Besides these, two large destroyers and three submarines are at present under construction.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUSION

SUCH, then, are the facts of the problem of the "Corridor".

They concern a Polish province which, in the course of a thousand years, has been separated from Poland on two different occasions. Although each of these separations lasted

for approximately one and a half centuries, Polish Pomerania returned each time to its motherland.

Its population—and this fact is recognized by the Germans themselves—has never ceased to be Polish.

It is the only access to the sea possessed by the Polish State, which has a population of thirty million inhabitants, a figure which increases on an average by 360,000 a year. Poland offers to Germany all possible facilities of transit between Eastern Prussia and the rest of the Reich. Germany may make full use of this transit, and yet the Polish traffic going from north to south is five times greater than the German traffic.

Not only has Germany no claim on this "Corridor", but its existence in no way handicaps her. And yet Germany clamours for its possession. Her reasons are of a special order: in the first place, her prestige is concerned; in the second place, there are considerations of a strategic order.

It is a fact that during past centuries Slavdom has retreated eastwards in the face of Germanism. But when the Slavs were retreating from the Elbe to the Oder, and from the Oder to the Vistula, national feeling was only in process of formation. But now the situation is entirely different. Germanism is faced with nations which are politically mature and morally united. The rehabilitation of Poland and Czechoslovakia has marked a halt and a retreat

for Germanism. The Teutonic mind feels humiliated by this fact, for it believed that the Slavonic peoples were destined for all times to serve the purposes of German colonization.

We understand this state of mind, which we do not in any way wish to exasperate by new territorial claims, even though they might be justified. We wish to forget the past. We cherish no hatred against Germany, a great nation whose contribution to the common inheritance of European civilization is important. But Germans, on their side, must bow to the verdict of history.

Already in certain German spheres a characteristic movement may be noted in favour of Germano-Polish understanding. In an article which created a sensation, published in *Germania* on February 20, 1927, Richard Künzer, an influential member of the German Catholic Party, wrote:

"Serious material differences divide Poland and Germany. But it is also human blindness which is responsible for the obstacles that lie between them, and such obstacles are even more difficult to surmount than the opposition arising from facts. Is this difference caused by fear? And if so, is it on Poland's part, or on Germany's? Or is it a reciprocal fear? Or, again, is it a hereditary hatred of the Prussians for the Poles, and the Poles for the Germans? . . . Only a few specialists realize clearly that to the east of Germany lies Poland, with thirty million

inhabitants. Next to France, she is our strongest and most important neighbour; soon she will be the most populous. . . . There is a Polish literature, a Polish art, a wealth of Polish tradition. The loyalty of the Poles to their national ideal during one hundred and fifty years of separation is the decisive proof of their right to existence as an independent State. And if to-day Poland, owing to some new cataclysm, were again to disappear, quiet and order in our eastern sphere would only be re-established after Poland had been rehabilitated anew. Poland's right to existence as an independent nation forms one of the fundamental realities of European politics. . . .

"Unlimited *naïveté* would be required to believe that Germany would undertake a separate war against Poland. The political edifice created at Locarno is so complex that the fall of a single stone would bring ruin in its wake. The famous theory of falling to ruin, you say? The hope of an economic and financial decay which would render Poland passive? These are ideas which no longer have adherents among serious thinkers in Germany. . . .

"There is only one path to be followed with regard to Poland: it is the path of understanding, and in any case that of a loyal attempt to reach an understanding. . . . It is time for our policy with regard to Poland to follow a well-determined and consistent line, and *vice versa*."

On April 20, 1927, Paul Scheffer, a talented German journalist and a shrewd observer, wrote as follows from Warsaw to the *Berliner Tageblatt*:

"The Germans commit an error when they view the future of Poland with a pessimism bordering on sadism. Poland is not a seasonal State. She is developing and growing gradually, despite the numerous difficulties springing up on her path. . . . On the German side it will be necessary to look realities squarely in the face, and to ask ourselves how we are to organize our future relations with Poland."

Herr Scheffer knows full well that there exist "grave political difficulties" between the two countries which, for the moment, are "insoluble". Nevertheless, he observes that the mutual relations between the two States "cannot always remain in suspense", and that "Germany must make up her mind to establish a *modus vivendi* with Poland, especially in the economic domain". In conclusion, Herr Scheffer advises both countries to apply a policy of *als ob*, or rather of *als ob nicht*—that is to say, a policy which would assume the "political difficulties" to be non-existent.

On October 21, 1928, another great German publicist, Georg Bernhardt, wrote in the democratic *Vossische Zeitung*:

"For the present, relations between Germany and the Western Powers show no signs of danger. The Locarno agreements, which may be interpreted by each country as it pleases,

constitute without doubt a guarantee against all warlike tendencies from the West. On the other hand, danger exists to the East.

"In Germany there exists a class of politicians which at one time believed in the possibility of reconquering by arms the territories lost by Germany. These illusions should be viewed in all fairness. . . . A war between Poland and Germany would not limit itself to two or three countries, but would become a universal war, taking place upon German territory, with not only the Silesian territories and the Corridor as stakes, but Germany's very existence. . . . The greater part of the German nation has understood the uselessness of such efforts. There can be no question of Germany desiring war against Poland. . . . It consequently behoves us to take a step forward. Germany must at last understand that Poland is not a State which may disappear from one day to the next. She must accustom herself to the idea that Poland is, and will remain, her neighbour, and that all the inconveniences and annoyances resulting to Germany from this state of affairs can only be removed by a peaceful understanding. . . . Poland exists", Herr Bernhardt concluded; "she is a factor which Germany must take into consideration, and Germany therefore must establish neighbourly relations with her."

The scope of these declarations made by Richard Künzer, Paul Scheffer, and Georg Bernhardt should not, however, be exaggerated.

In many German circles they are looked upon as manifestations of intolerable weakness, and as almost anti-patriotic.

On May 19, 1927, the *Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung*, an organ of the Popular Party (Herr Stresemann's party!) contained the following:

"Some of our short-sighted politicians have unfortunately never been able to adopt Bismarck's realistic viewpoint and understand that Poland's rehabilitation is not acceptable to Prussia. . . . When shall all of us succeed in realizing that the Polish problem is not a question of sentiment, but a question of life and death, and that whosoever refuses to understand this commits a crime against the German nation and its mission in the East?"

It should not be thought that such ideas originate only from a few excited brains in Königsberg. Prince Lichnowsky, a former German Ambassador in London, is reputed to have been hostile to the policy of aggressive militarism of Wilhelm II and his clique. Shortly before his death (February 27, 1928), he wrote a book entitled *Auf dem Wege zum Abgrund* (*On the Path to the Abyss*). In this book, the English translation of which has recently been published, Prince Lichnowsky wrote that "the Russian-German frontiers should not have been touched", that the "German Empire included no indisputably Polish territory", and that "the Polish question

constitutes the *sanguinary* but sure basis of Germano-Russian friendship".[1]

It is true that there are German nationalists who will remain hostile to this friendship so long as the Soviet rule lasts. While awaiting the fall of this régime, and perhaps in the hope of accelerating it, they "look towards the west" and recommend a Franco-German "alliance". This is the case propounded by the *Jungdeutscher Orden* and its "Grand-Master", Herr Arthur Mahraun. The purpose of this policy is to leave Germany's hands free to the East.

In the course of an argument with us on the subject of the "Corridor", Herr Arnold Rechberg, a great German industrialist—whose contact with the *Jungdeutscher Orden* is well known—exclaimed: "Justice has nothing to do with politics. . . . Alone military and economic power counts for Germany. . . . And if Poland does not return us the 'Corridor', Germany will give her exemplary punishment by taking from her not only this territory, but also Posnania, Upper Silesia, and yet other lands."[2]

The "European language" spoken by Herr Rechberg, even though it is little in harmony with the Kellogg Pact, is by no means a new language. The world is familiar with it. It was because rights held no place in Imperial Germany, and because her Chancellor designated as "scraps of paper" treaties which were signed

[1] *Auf dem Wege zum Abgrund*, Berlin, 1927; Vol. I, p. 55; Vol. II, pp. 302–3, 329, 335, and 345.

[2] Paris *Avenir*, August 7, 1927.

voluntarily, that twenty-four nations joined France, Belgium, and Serbia when they were attacked. Has this lesson served no purpose?

Will the German people once again forget that they are not the only nation in Europe, and that other peoples have equal right to a place in the sun? Until now we have only put forward historical, ethnographical, and economic arguments. But there exist moral arguments which are even stronger.

Inherent justice has triumphed. Absolutely perfect frontiers, satisfying everyone, are irrealizable. But it cannot honestly be denied that, thanks to the territorial status of the new Europe (a status bought at the price of many lives), there is more justice in Europe to-day than there has ever been in the past.

Why should the "Corridor" be reincorporated with Germany? Why substitute for a supposed Polish "Corridor" a German Corridor—and a real one this time, for it would cross non-German territory? Why should misplaced pride lift strategical speculations above the rights of a great nation to full independence? Why should the territorial access to the Reich of a province of two million inhabitants be greater than that of a nation of thirty millions to the sea?

No, the Polish-German frontiers shall not be revised. Poland, because she possesses a seacoast of her own, is, so to speak, neighbour to sea-going nations of the world. If Germany's thesis were admitted, she would—as was most

justly remarked by the great English publicist who signs himself "Augur"—"exercise a veritable monopoly of the means of communication with the Continent".[1] This monopoly would make the commerce of Great Britain, Scandinavia, France, and America dependent upon Germany's good will, not only in connection with Poland, but also with all the countries of Central Europe.

"Augur", who shows clear judgment and is always well informed, also considered the case of Czechoslovakia. He writes as follows in his latest book, entitled *Eagles, Black and White*:[2]

"Czechoslovakia and other Central European countries are protected at present against exorbitant railway tariffs to German ports on the Baltic and in the North Sea by the possibility of using the alternative route through Poland to the sea. A German Corridor would eliminate competition, and Germany would be in a position to dictate tariffs to Central Europe. This is not desirable, either from the point of view of the interests of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other States on the Continent, or from that of British trade interests. The Pomorze (Pomerania) allows British trade to penetrate direct to Poland, and to a great hinterland; it protects it against a railway monopoly. A German

[1] As remarked by "AUGUR" in the *Fortnightly Review*, August, 1928.

[2] *Eagles, Black and White*, London, D. Appleton & Co., 1929, pp. 120–1. This book contains an excellent general exposé of the question of the "Corridor".

Corridor presents no advantages to British trade: on the contrary, it makes it dependent on German good will. Again, under normal conditions, which will certainly come back, the trade of a large part of Russia gravitates towards the Western Baltic. The Pomorze leaves to that trade the choice of alternative routes over different national territory. We see that from the point of view of international trade the Polish Corridor is preferable to the German one."

The Czechoslovaks are entirely in agreement with the fore-mentioned British opinion.

"The importance of Danzig and Gdynia for Czechoslovakia", writes a Czech economist,[1] "results from the fact that they are accessible by direct route without crossing German territory. This consideration would become of immediate interest should Germany attempt, by adopting a tariff policy prejudicial to Czechoslovakia, to place obstacles in the way of her foreign trade."

The "Corridor" is necessary to Europe for yet another reason. It is a new experiment in international right. We have here a maritime city, dependent on the League of Nations in its domestic affairs, and on Poland for its foreign affairs; we have a Polish province through which Germany communicates with Eastern Prussia as freely as she likes. This is a new formula of international collaboration which in

[1] GEORGE HEJDA in *L'Europe Centrale* (Prague), May 5, 1928.

time will certainly extend to other sections of Europe. For Europe is small, and if one persists in continually revising her frontiers, new wars will be provoked which may, perhaps, mark the end of our civilization. Is it forgotten that Bolshevism threatens all of us, and that it is precisely in the clash of unintelligent nationalistic movements that it places its hopes?

The economic interdependence of nations is now recognized by all enlightened minds. The future does not belong to those who dream of again separating territories which have been returned to their legitimate owners, nor yet to those who aspire again to change frontiers so that they may the better dominate others; it is for those who strive to make the barriers lower, to make them economically sound and invisible.

It is such a policy which Poland applies to her maritime province, the Germano-Polish cross-roads. She desires to collaborate frankly and loyally with Germany. Confident in her own self and in the alliances which she has succeeded in contracting, Poland advances resolutely upon the path which leads to the settlement of all differences arising from the rehabilitation of her independent existence in Eastern Europe. We believe that she would be ready to demilitarize her "Corridor", provided that Germany demilitarized Eastern Prussia and part of Prussian Pomerania, as was recently suggested by an English writer.[1]

[1] "NORDICUS" in the *Review of Reviews*, London, March 1928.

But Poles cannot think of the "Corridor" otherwise than as Frederick the Great and Bismarck did. Frederick wrote: "Whosoever holds the mouth of the Vistula and the city of Danzig wields more mastery over Poland than he who is its ruler. . . ."[1]

And as for Bismarck, he did not doubt that "for a Polish State, the possession of Danzig and Western Prussia (i.e. the 'Corridor') is a vital necessity".

All Poles are firmly convinced of this, though, truly, this has not always been the case. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when at the summit of her power, Poland somewhat neglected her access to the sea. A Polish poet of the sixteenth century, Sebastian Klonowicz, even assures us that

> A Pole may not know what the sea is
> If he ploughs diligently. . . .

This error of judgment caused a German poet of the nineteenth century, Ernst-Moritz Arndt, to write as follows: "Poland did not know that her duty as a nation lay, above all, in the defence of her maritime frontiers and in ex-

[1] See G. B. Volz: *Die politischen Testamente Friedrichs der Grosse*, p. 135. Let us recall here another statement made by Frederick the Great. On April 9, 1772, at the time of the first division, he wrote these blasphemous words to his brother Henry: "We shall take communion from the same eucharistic flesh, which is Poland, and even though it is not beneficient to our souls, it certainly will be beneficient to our States. . . ." (*Œuvres de Fréderic le Grand*, Berlin, 1855, Vol. XXVI, p. 356).

pelling the Teutonic Knights from them. This neglect on her part was the cause of Poland's death."[1]

Arndt was right, though it is easy to judge of outstanding historical events when looking back on them. The great kings of ancient Poland duly understood the importance of *liberum dominium maris* for the prosperity and independence of their State, but they were not always understood and followed by the nobility —that is, by the ruling class of their times.

The citizens of rehabilitated Poland, rich in the teachings of modern history, realize that an outlet to the sea is the essential necessity for the free development of Poland's prosperity. They cannot allow a recurrence of former errors. They respect the established conditions and wish to "drive out" no one, since a solution has been found, but they do not, nor in the future will, admit any discussion concerning the revision of German-Polish frontiers. And if these frontiers were threatened, they would fight for them by every means, as one fights for that which is most precious to one: one's right to live.

A plant is linked to the soil only by a slender stem, yet it could not live without this union. Poland is joined to the sea by a narrow strip of land, and without this contact she could not exist. Those who wish to cut Poland off from her natural outlet to the sea are endeavouring to render her existence impossible.

[1] E. M. Arndt: *Germanien und Europa*, 1803, p. 327.

APPENDICES

I

THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE GERMANO-POLISH FRONTIERS

On January 29, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers summoned the Polish delegates, MM. Roman Dmowski and Erazm Piltz, in order to learn from them the territorial demands of Poland. M. Dmowski, the chief delegate, demanded with regard to Germany all territories the majority of whose inhabitants were Poles, together with Danzig, to serve as Poland's seaport. In a note sent on February 28, 1919, he stated in precise manner the claims of Poland in the West.

The matter was entrusted to a Commission of Polish Frontiers, of which the President was M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, and of which the members were General le Rond (France), Sir William Tyrrell (Great Britain), the Marquis della Torretta (Italy), Mr. Isaiah Bowman (U.S.A.), and M. Otchiai (Japan). At the beginning of March the Commission finished its work. It granted to Poland with unanimity of votes not only the whole of Upper Silesia and Danzig, but also a part of East Prussia with the Warsaw–Eylau–Danzig railway.

It was then necessary for the Supreme Council to approve the findings of the Commission. Mr. Lloyd George, seconded by his secretary, Mr. Philip Kerr, at once attacked the proposed frontier of Kwidzyn (Marienwerder). He began by cutting away the direct Warsaw–Danzig railway by demanding a plebiscite of this region. He then obtained the establishment of Danzig as a Free City.

The British delegate, Sir William Tyrrell, opposed these arrangements from within the Commission which, on April 12, 1919, confirmed for the second time, and again unanimously, its first proposals

The Supreme Council did not adopt the recommendations of its experts. And the Supreme Council consisted of Woodrow Wilson, who desired that Poland should obtain neither too much nor too little, but only that which was ethnographically Polish; Mr. Lloyd George, of whom

Polish Frontier in Pomerania at the time of the Peace Conference.

an American expert said that he "regarded Poland as passive rather than active" (Robert H. Lord in *What Really Happened in Paris*); and, lastly, M. Clemenceau, who, hemmed in between his two partners, and after defending the interests of France, upheld, in addition, a difficult struggle on behalf of Poland "against British inclinations" (see Tardieu: *La Paix*, p. 427).

These circumstances were nothing if not unfavourable to Poland's demands. Although M. Clemenceau might be regarded as favourably inclined to Poland, his intentions were nevertheless paralysed by the inexplicable Polonophobia of Mr. Lloyd George; besides which, in order to have his way over the Rhine question, M. Clemenceau gave way over that of the Vistula. . . . As to President Wilson, he never left his role of arbiter, severe and just, and unaffected by considerations of European equilibrium.

It is, therefore, quite certain that the acquisitions made by Poland at the Peace Conference were a strict minimum, and that it would have been supremely unjust to have accorded less.

On May 7, 1919, the *Terms of Peace* were sent to Germany with the Polish frontiers as suggested by the Commission, but "corrected" by Mr. Lloyd George, namely Danzig to become a Free City, with a plebiscite to decide the fate of the Kwidzyn (Marienwerder) and Olsztyn (Allenstein) areas.

On May 29th the German delegation, presided over by Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, addressed to the Supreme Council its *Comments on the Peace Terms*. The German delegates protested especially against assigning Upper Silesia to Poland, and Mr. Lloyd George laid great stress on the German argument which was cleverly based on Wilsonian principles. On June 14th the plebiscite of this area was ordered by the Supreme Council, and the decision was brought to the knowledge of Germany in the *Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Comments of the German Delegation* (June 16th).

In this important document the Powers laid down as follows the two principles which dictated their attitude towards Poland (p. 12):

"The first (principle) is that the Allied and Associated Powers are placed under the very special obligation of using the victory they have gained to restore to the Polish

nation the independence of which she was most unjustly deprived over a century ago. This spoliation was one of the greatest injustices ever recorded by History, a crime the memories and the consequences of which have for long poisoned the political life of a great part of the continent of Europe. . . . The first duty of the Allies is to repair this injustice. . . .

"The second principle, proclaimed by the Allies and formally accepted by Germany, is that there shall be restored to re-established Poland the regions inhabited by a population indisputably Polish."

On June 28, 1919, in the famous gallery of the Royal Palace of Versailles—where on January 21, 1871, the German Union had been proclaimed—the Peace Treaty was signed, amongst others by Herr Hermann Müller and Dr. Bell on behalf of Germany, and by MM. Dmowski and I. J. Paderewski on behalf of Poland.

Article 87 of the Treaty reads:

"Germany recognizes, as the Allied and Associated Powers have already recognized, the complete independence of Poland. . . ."

II

THE GERMANO-POLISH TERRITORIAL STATUS AND THE LOCARNO AGREEMENTS

THE Locarno Agreements, initialled on October 16, 1925, and signed in London on December 1st of the same year, comprised the following diplomatic acts:

(*a*) A treaty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, called the *Pact of the Rhenish Guarantee*.

(*b*) Four treaties, or conventions of arbitration, between Germany on the one hand, and France, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on the other.

(*c*) Treaties of Guarantee between Poland, Czechoslovakia, and France.

(*d*) A collective Note from the States participating in the Conference of Locarno on the subject of Article 16 of the Pact of the League of Nations, with regard to the entrance of Germany into the League.

The Agreements of Locarno were criticized in France as well as in Poland. It was noticed that a pact of guarantee had been concluded regarding a German frontier, whereas for the others there were simple treaties of arbitration. The reason was that England neither could nor would undertake to guarantee directly a frontier other than the Western one. It is for this reason that efforts were made to find, on the one hand in a Germano-Polish Convention of arbitration, and on the other in a treaty of Franco-Polish guarantee, some other settlement more or less equal in value to that of a pact of guarantee.

This convention and this treaty are acts of the greatest importance from the European point of view, as well as from that of Poland.

Here is the preamble of the Germano-Polish Convention:

"The President of the German Empire and the President of the Polish Republic;

"Being equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Poland by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries;

"Declaring that rights established by treaty or resulting from the rights of peoples are binding to international tribunals;

"Agreeing to recognize that the rights of a State can only be modified with its own consent;

"And believing that sincere observance of methods of peaceful settlement in international disputes permits of solving, without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause of division between States;

"Have decided to embody in a treaty their common intentions in this respect. . . ."

These clauses, in a negative form, emphasize that the two States do not intend to make war and that they must respect the treaties.

Furthermore, the Germano-Polish Convention of Arbitration contains Article 21 thus conceived:

"The present treaty, which is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not in any way affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties as members of the League of Nations, and shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world."

This reservation is of double importance.

It stresses that Germany and Poland, both being members of the League of Nations, shall each, in conformity with Article 10 of the Pact, have the obligation of respecting the territorial integrity and the actual political independence of the other, and it further indicates that the Germano-Polish Convention contains nothing preventing Poland from applying, with regard to Germany, Articles 15 and 16 of the Pact in the event of the violation of the Rhenish agreement. In other words, Poland's bond of guarantee respecting France in the event of the latter being attacked is preserved.

Similarly in the Rhenish Pact the same reservations are made by France on behalf of Poland. By virtue of Article 2 of this agreement, Germany and France mutually agree that neither shall engage in any attack or invasion or in any circumstance have recourse to war. Nevertheless these clauses do not affect any case involving the fulfilment of obligations contracted as members of the League of Nations, nor the application of Articles 15 (§ 7) and 16 of the Pact of the League (which concerns the assistance to be given to France by Poland and Czechoslovakia).

Lastly, France and Poland, having resolved "mutually to guarantee the benefits" of the agreements signed at Locarno, concluded a treaty of special guarantee of which the first article stipulates that,

"In the event of Germany failing to abide by her engagements towards Poland or France, France and Poland, reciprocally, and in pursuance of Article 16 of the Pact of the League of Nations, undertake to give each other immediate assistance if such a failure is accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms."

III

PRUSSIA'S WORD

After the first partition (1772), in the course of which Prussia seized the present "Corridor", but not Danzig or Thorn, Poland attempted to divide the massed front of her enemies. She proposed to her western neighbour a defensive alliance against Russia, and on March 29, 1790, it was solemnly signed at Warsaw. The two States mutually guaranteed "the peaceful possession of the provinces and towns" which were already theirs. The Polish rulers thus thought to purchase friendly relations with Prussia, and her eventual support against Russian machinations, at the price of the "Corridor".

But on October 29, 1790, the King of Prussia offered to procure the Crimea for Russia from the Turks at the price of Russia's intervention in Poland on behalf of the cession of Danzig and Thorn to Prussia.

On May 3, 1791, the Polish Diet, working at the remodelling of the State, voted the celebrated *Constitution*, which would have saved the country if the solidarity of the partitioners had not been renewed. On May 23rd the King of Prussia congratulated "his brother", the King of

Poland, concerning the introduction of the hereditary succession to the throne of Poland. But on May 14th the Prussian Minister, Hertzberg, admitted his fears to Berlin's representative in Warsaw:

"The Kingdom of Poland has become hereditary and has received a constitution stronger and better organized than that of England. I believe that Poland will, thanks to that, become equally dangerous to Prussia, and will sooner or later again take West Prussia (the 'Corridor') and perhaps even East Prussia" (Karol Lutostanski: *The Partitions of Poland and the Struggle for Independence*, Lausanne, 1918, p. 115).

A year later the King of Prussia betrayed "his brother", the King of Poland.

IV

GERMAN COLONIZATION IN POLAND

THE beginning of systematic German colonization goes back to the epoch of Frederick the Great. We cannot describe here the moving and instructive struggle which the Poles of Poznań and of Pomerania victoriously maintained for the preservation of their land. Details are to be found in the monograph by Maryan Seyda and in the study of the problem made by Henri Moysset.

Colonization on a grand scale, however, dates only from 1886. On April 26th of that year a German law was promulgated which was the first of a series of exceptional measures directed against Polish property. On June 30, 1904, the *Settlement Law* was vigorously applied, and on March 30, 1908, the *Law of Expropriation*, which was the most iniquitous of all, for it attacked even the very principle of ownership.

The resistance of the Poles to these laws of spoliation was admirable but, during the period 1886–1914, the Commission of Prussian Colonization (*Ansiedelungkommission*) had acquired 453,174 hectares of land in Poznań and Pomerania, of which 126,310 were allotted to Poles and the remainder to the great German proprietors. 21,257 colonies were established.

A special Society, the *Deutscher Ostmarkenverein* (German Union of the Marches of the East) conducted propaganda in Germany in favour of a policy of colonization. This group was formed in 1894. Its founders were Hansemann, Kennemann, and Tiedemann, hence the current denomination of *hakatism*, derived from their initials placed in juxtaposition.

V

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE "OSTMARKENVEREIN"

In 1913 the *Ostmarkenverein* issued a particularly valuable map, the object of which was to illustrate the results of ruthless Germanization of the Polish provinces. Although the progress of Germanization was alarming, the Poles were in the majority in forty-seven districts (*Bezirke*) out of seventy-one, and in seven they formed from 40 to 50 per cent. of the population.

It was in order to draw the attention of German opinion to this "alarming" state of affairs that the *Ostmarkenverein* issued its map, the ultimate object in view being to make Parliament vote new credits in order to pursue the anti-Polish "Kulturarbeit" in the East.

Inherent justice triumphed, however. But the *Ostmarkenverein* continues to exist and has learnt nothing and has forgotten nothing, with only one exception: it has forgotten its map of 1913. Indeed, we read the following, among

other matters, in its appeal published on January 10, 1929, on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the coming into force of the *Treaty of Versailles*:

"False historical documents have attributed to Poland the provinces of Eastern Germany. . . ."

THE EVIDENCE OF THE "OSTMARKENVEREIN."

Reduced reproduction of a coloured map published by the *Ostmarkenverein* in 1913. The chequered districts were those with more than 50 per cent. of Poles; the diagonally ruled districts had numbers varying from 25 per cent. to 50 per cent. The black dots indicate the German colonies founded since 1886.

Why false? Has the *Ostmarkenverein* itself not recognized that Polish majorities existed in Poznań, in Western Prussia, and in Silesia?

The *Excelsior* of August 16, 1927, published a letter from Berlin, signed by Heinrich Hertz. The author gave

an account of a conversation he had had with Herr August Abel, chief of the editorial staff of the *Jungdeutscher Orden*. In appealing to French public opinion, Herr Abel asked:

"Has one the right to continue disagreement over the legitimate claim for a rectification of the Polish 'Corridor', of which the entire population is German?"

If Herr Abel really used these words, he gave proof either of his ignorance or of his . . . imprudence. For the *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich* for the year 1927 affirms the contrary. On page 11 it publishes figures which show that in Polish Pomerania there are actually 411,621 Germans out of a total of 964,704 inhabitants. This last figure is certainly fantastic, but be that as it may, the *Jahrbuch* has only been able to account for 42·7 per cent. of Germans in the "Corridor", thus owning that the Poles are in the majority there.

VI

THE ELECTIONS IN POLISH POMERANIA

SINCE the rehabilitation of the State, legislative elections have taken place three times: on January 26, 1919, on November 5, 1922, and on March 4, 1928. It is a definite fact that there is entire freedom of vote in Poland. National minorities are, therefore, represented in the *Sejm* (the Chamber of Deputies) in proportion to their numbers within the State.

Let us see how the province of Pomerania, that is to say the "Corridor", has voted. As Pomerania was still under German occupation on January 26, 1919, she was not able to vote for deputies to the first Polish *Sejm*. We shall, therefore, only analyse the results of the voting of 1922 and 1928.

The province is divided into three electoral areas. That of Tczew (No. 29) is composed of the following districts: Tczew, Gniew, Starogard, Koscierzyna, Kartuzy, Wejherowo, and Puck. That of Grudziądz (No. 30) is composed of the districts of Grudziądz, Chojnice, Sepolno, Swiecie, and Tuchola; while the districts of Toruń, Chelmno, Brodnica, Wabrzezno, Lubawa, and Dzialdowo go to make the area of Toruń (No. 31).

The result of the polls was as follows:

Area.	Total Number of Votes.		Votes obtained by German Lists.	
	1922.	1928.	1922.	1928.
Tczew ..	115,470	143,348	13,073	17,658
Grudziądz ..	105,951	136,786	23,648	27,835
Toruń ..	120,172	148,293	15,243	19,288
Total ..	341,593	428,427	51,964	64,781

From this it can be seen that in 1922 the German lists received 15·3 per cent. of the votes, and that in 1928 this proportion was but a little smaller (15·1 per cent.).

VII

SOME REASONED OPINIONS FROM GERMANY

In July 1927 Professor Friedrich Wilhelm Förster, a well-known German pacifist, made some declarations to the Correspondent of the Warsaw paper *Epoka* which are of the highest interest to the student of Polish-German

relations. The Paris *Avenir* reprinted these in its issue of July 27, 1927.

According to Herr Förster, the sudden apparition of the "Corridor" in the midst of German territory is significant of infinitely more than a decision of the Treaty of Versailles, and follows on historical causes much more profound than the victory of the Allied armies: "The Treaty of Versailles only provided a formula for an existing fact. . . ."

Herr Helmuth von Gerlach has devoted an article to the question of the "Corridor" in the Berlin pacifist review *Die Friedenswarte* (July 1927). According to him, "the Polish nationality of the Kashubes is not questionable". He acknowledges elsewhere the Polish character of Poznań, and he states that the regions situated between the Kashubes and Poznań "are of a doubtful ethnographical character", and that "the demarcation of a frontier separating the two interested parties is impossible". Herr von Gerlach concludes: "It is impossible to compensate an injustice due to the demarcation of the frontier in Eastern Prussia by a new injustice. The Treaties, ratified by Germany, must absolutely be respected."

Father Friedrich Muckermann, a German Jesuit, published in the Berlin weekly *Das Tagebuch* (September 11, 1927) a courageous article on Germano-Polish relations. The following is an extract:

"We must not forget that our frontiers of 1914 were not the result of an equitable evolution but of three violations, each of which was a crime. And when we look upon our actual eastern frontier, should we not consider the revenge of history? Is not this 'Corridor' a retribution incurred by those who deserved punishment for their inhuman offences? . . . Yes, I know of the sufferings of our brothers in Poland, but it is not through hysteria over frontiers that we shall ameliorate their fate. A loyal and sincere understanding with Poland is necessary."

Herr Heinz Kraschutski, a former officer of the German Navy, wrote in the weekly *Das Andere Deutschland* (December 1, 1928), which appeared at Hagen in Westphalia:

"A policy which tends to isolate Poland from her Allies in order to recover Polish Pomerania is most dangerous because it is based on bad faith. Are there, indeed, still some in Germany ingenuous enough to believe that Poland is disposed to cede willingly a province inhabited by 90 per cent. of Poles to a neighbour who did not cease to oppress it for a century and a half? Why, on the other hand, seek again to take this territory unless there exists for us some vital necessity? This is a policy of illusion which would infallibly lead to a new world war."

VIII

THE GRENZMARK POZNAŃ-WEST PRUSSIA, OR SYMBOLIC BORDER PROVINCE

THE Germano-Polish frontier is an ethnographical frontier. That is to say, the Treaty of Versailles did not take into account the historical frontiers of Western Prussia (or Polish Pomerania) and of Poznań, such as they were in 1772. The result is that several districts of these two provinces were assigned, in part or in whole, to Germany.

In West Prussia alone the district of Deutsch-Krone (*Walcz*) was left entirely to Germany, whilst the new frontier cut into equal parts the districts of Schlochau (*Czluchow*) and Flatow (*Zlotow*).

In Poznań the whole of the district of Schwerin (*Skwierzyna*) as well as portions of six other districts were left to Germany.

Instead of uniting them, as regards administration, to their neighbouring provinces, Germany has on the contrary

THE
GRENZMARK
Scale of Miles
0 10 20 30
GERMANY
SCHLOCHAU
FLATOW
DEUTSCH-KRONE
SCHNEIDEMÜHL
CHODZIEZ
WIELEN
CZARNKOW
MIEDZYCHOD
SCHWERIN
MESERITZ
POZNAN
POLAND
BOMST
FRAUSTADT

formed out of them a new administrative unit: the *Grenzmark Posen-Westpreussen*. The outline of these "frontier-Marches" is very peculiar; moreover, it comprises two districts geographically separate; no economic interest militates in favour of its existence, and the communications between the different districts are difficult.

We are, in fact, confronted with a province that is merely symbolical.

Herr von Bülow, its governor, wrote in the proclamation issued at Schneidemühl, his headquarters, on New Year's Day, 1929:

"The small frontier March, Poznań–West Prussia, can certainly be considered an element of the German East Marches (*Ostmark*), the reconstruction of which is important. Our interests and our particular anxieties should not make us forget our object. . . ."

The *Ostmark* to be "reconstructed" includes the whole of Poznań and East Prussia.

IX

NAVIGATION ON THE VISTULA

In a propagandist statement printed in French, English, and German under the auspices of the *Jungdeutscher Orden*, there appears the following sentence:

"Nowadays the entire navigation on the Vistula during a month is often less than it was formerly during a day" (*Der "Polnische" Korridor*, pp. 18 and 26).

This allegation is false. In 1912, according to the official German statistics, 3,769 ships, of a total displacement of 775,436 tons, passed up or down the Vistula between Danzig and Warsaw. In 1927 the navigation on the same section of the Polish river amounted to 2,878 ships of a

total displacement of 703,467 tons, the decrease of tonnage being only 9 per cent.

Poland cannot spend all at once the 500 million zlotys which the regularization of all her navigable waterways (of a length of nearly 5,000 kilometres) will cost her. She proceeds by degrees. At the present time the Vistula between Toruń and Warsaw is being deepened and a modern river port is being constructed in the capital. The first part of this work, which includes a large lateral canal and two basins, will be finished in 1929.

X

HISTORY OF THE OPALENIE BRIDGE

In 1906, for strategic reasons, Germany undertook the construction of a new bridge over the Vistula at Opalenie (*Münsterwalde*). The sum of nine million marks was spent to make this fifth connection between the banks of the Lower Vistula, at a point bearing no economic importance whatsoever. The bridge was finished in 1909.

When Poland took possession of Pomerania, the local railway which passed over this bridge lost its original purpose, and the main transit lines passed over the bridges of Tczew (*Dirschau*), Grudziądz (*Graudenz*), Fordon, and Toruń (*Thorn*). Poland left the bridge at Opalenie open for foot-passengers and vehicles. In 1927 an average of 19 passengers *per diem* crossed the bridge; and as for vehicles, scarcely 203 motor-cars made use of it in the course of the same year.

The Polish Government then decided to transfer the bridge to the town of Toruń, where the need of a further passage over the Vistula was felt. It was common sense that inspired this measure, but unfortunately common sense, in spite of Descartes' opinion, does not seem to

be the most evenly distributed quality among men. The German Nationalist Press blamed Poland for failing to show due respect to the works of German culture. Herr H. Pfafferott, the correspondent of *Germania* in Paris, wrote

Bridges over the lower Vistula.

in *Pax* on July 6, 1928, that Poland had destroyed "the last possibility of an amelioration and an extension of the railway communications between Eastern Prussia and the Kingdom".

We have already shown that these communications

function admirably and that they are sufficient for their purpose, besides which Poland is ready to give favourable consideration to all German demands concerning transit. But there is nothing in common between the main lines of communication and the side track which passes over the bridge of Opalenie.

The contradictions which spoil the arguments set forth by Germany do not lack a certain piquancy. Assuming, indeed, that the Opalenie bridge will fulfil the needs of the people, one cannot but admit that it is Poland who will confer this privilege upon it, for the bridge will be moved to a more suitable position.

XI

THE POSITION IN EASTERN PRUSSIA

FROM the administrative point of view Eastern Prussia forms a province of the Reich, governed by an *Oberpräsident* appointed by the Prussian Government (*not* by the Imperial Government). This post has been held since the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by Dr. Ernst Siehr, a former democrat.

The provinces of Germany enjoy a degree of administrative autonomy. There is therefore in Königsberg a *Provinziallandtag* of eighty members, of which the absolute majority belong to the reactionary group consisting of a union of the Popular Party (*Volkspartei*) and the German National Party (*Deutsch-National*). Its leader is Baron von Gayl, an ardent nationalist and monarchist.

Eastern Prussia is essentially an agricultural country. In direct opposition to the conditions found in the rest of Germany, the urban population is here in a minority, forming only 36 per cent. of the total, and agriculture and stock-breeding are beyond doubt the real assets of the district. A great central organization, the *Landwirt-*

schaftkammer für die Provinz Ostpreussen (Chamber of Agriculture for the Province of Eastern Prussia)—of which the budget exceeds three million marks—is engaged in the general supervision of agriculture, being directed by a council of ten members presided over by Dr. Brandes, a large landowner of Insterburg. There is also a private organization of avowed monarchist tendencies, the *Landwirtschaftsverband Ostpreussen*, consisting of 50,000 landowners possessing between them two million hectares, that is to say 90 per cent. of the total area. Its leader is Baron von Gehren, a large landowner of Oletzko.

The economic situation of the large landowners of Eastern Prussia is far from good. One of them, Herr Karl von Plehwe, a member of the Prussian Landtag, informed us lately in the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* (December 29, 1928) that out of 1,665 estates of at least 100 hectares, 214 are mortgaged for over 70 per cent. of their value; 163 estates are liable for 70 per cent., and 620 for 60 per cent., of their value.

Herr Plehwe considers that the agricultural situation of Eastern Prussia is serious and that it requires immediate assistance. He therefore proposes that all short-term debts be converted into long-term loans on mortgage, at an interest of 3 per cent., and suggests several other measures which would cost the State 500 million marks, the expenditure to be spread over two years.

Herr Plehwe finishes his article with a threat:

"If by April 1, 1929, nothing has been done," he writes, "the patience of Eastern Prussia will end. There are still men in Eastern Prussia who know how to take into their hands the destinies of this province. We do not wish to be Poles, we wish to remain Prussians. . . ."

The distance of Eastern Prussia from the great industrial areas of Germany makes the sale of their agricultural produce difficult in those areas. In 1926 the transportation of a ton of rye from Königsberg to Essen cost £2, whilst

the freightage on the same cargo from New York to Antwerp would have amounted only to eleven shillings.

The *Ostpreussiche Zeitung* of Königsberg published some statistics on August 23, 1928, tending to prove that the number of estates sold in Eastern Prussia has not ceased to increase. Here are the figures:

Area of the Estates.	1925–26.	1926–27.	1927–28.
Below 20 hectares ..	90	251	277
From 20 to 100 hectares..	21	102	121
Above 100 hectares ..	9	63	73

The geographical conditions which, on the one hand, are a source of difficulty to Eastern Prussia do, on the other, confer certain advantages on her. Dr. Mager writes in his book *Ostpreussen, die natürlichen Grundlagen seiner Wirtschaft, eine Quelle deutscher Kraft* (*The Natural Riches of Eastern Prussia, Source of German Power*), Hamburg, 1922:

"The great distance which separates Eastern Prussia from the principal industrial centres as well as from the large cities of Central and Western Germany, has prevented the excessive exportation of agricultural produce towards the West. Consequently the price of food commodities and the rate of wages are maintained at a level far below those of the rest of Germany" (p. 7).

This has not, however, prevented a considerable exodus from the interior of Eastern Prussia to the industrial centres of Western Germany. The *Deutsche Zeitung* of Berlin asserted, on August 5, 1928, that from 1900 to 1927 half a million men had thus left Eastern Prussia, and that it is this which accounts for the fact that Eastern Prussia has only 58 inhabitants to the square kilometre,

whilst over the whole of Germany the density of population averages 138 inhabitants to the square kilometre.

Königsberg, the capital of Eastern Prussia, numbered in 1927 a little over 290,000 inhabitants; 41,000 inhabitants drew their revenues from trading and 47,000 from industry. The Imperial Government considerably reduced the cost of transportation on goods sent to Königsberg, and gave the necessary credits for the enlarging of the port (three new docks have recently been built). In addition, Königsberg has been endowed with a large aerodrome.

XII

POLAND AND EASTERN PRUSSIA

Despite the tariff "war" that has been fought between Germany and Poland since the month of June 1925, commercial intercourse between Poland and Eastern Prussia has increased without break.

Thus the total value of Polish imports from Germany decreased between 1923 and 1927 from 487,000,000 to 428,000,000 gold-francs; while the imports from Eastern Prussia increased from 2,300,000 to 6,600,000 gold-francs (286 per cent.).

Meanwhile Polish exports to Germany shrank during the same period of time from 604,000,000 to 467,000,000 gold-francs. Nevertheless, Polish exports to Eastern Prussia increased from 10,500,000 to 52,000,000 gold-francs, which represents an increase of 496 per cent. We see that the necessities of life are stronger than measures of political urgency.

We have quoted in the text of our study an extract from a memorandum written by Dr. Fritz Simon, a former official of the Königsberg Chamber of Commerce, who favoured a customs union between Poland and

Eastern Prussia. Herr Adolf von Batocki, *Oberpräsident* of Eastern Prussia at the time of the German downfall, apparently had a similar plan in mind. A Herr Beckmann, a director of the journal *Deutsche Aufgaben*, then accused him of being a "Polonophile", and Herr von Batocki brought an action for libel against him. The case came before the Königsberg tribunal on December 13, 1920.

In the course of the sitting von Batocki related that he had actually thought, at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, of proclaiming an independent State uniting Eastern Prussia and Polish Pomerania. He thus thought to save the "Germanism" of the East; but the Socialists hesitated to give their support to this plan, and General von Below, commanding the Army Corps of Danzig, flatly refused. In recounting this, Herr von Batocki made no hesitation in adding:

"Everyone knows that we ought to have economic relations with Poland . . ." ("Dass wir wieder wirtschaftliche Beziehungen mit Polen anbahnen müssen weiss jedermann" . . .).

These relations are in the interest of both countries, but the German Nationalists, including those of Eastern Prussia, prefer to inveigh against the "Corridor" rather than face facts. What is the consequence? Writing from Elbing, in East Prussia, to the *Deutsche Allegemeine Zeitung*, an important Nationalist paper in Berlin, a correspondent states that amongst the people may be heard such expressions as, "It would be better if the Poles were here"; and he adds:

"The situation is so serious that not only are such ideas prevalent, but they are also expressed aloud. It is said that the Poles are conducting propaganda but, in point of fact, such action is scarcely necessary. The contrast between the economic situation here and that of Poland stares one in the face and constitutes the best of all propaganda."

XIII

M. DMOWSKI'S MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT WILSON

HERR ARTHUR MAHRAUN, "Grand Master" of the *Jungdeutscher Orden*, went to Danzig on July 1, 1928, and there delivered a vindictive speech to the young German Nationalists. In order to justify the claim for the return of the "Corridor", he dwelt on the memorandum which a Polish politician, M. Roman Dmowski, had sent to President Wilson on October 8, 1918. Herr Mahraun assured his audience that in it there occurred the two following sentences:

"If Eastern Prussia is to remain German territory, Germany ought also to have Western Prussia (that is to say, the 'Corridor'). The 'Corridor' has no value for Poland if Eastern Prussia is not added into the bargain. . . ."

German propaganda often makes use of this quotation, but it is entirely incorrect. Here is what M. Dmowski wrote upon the subject in his memorandum:

"If Eastern Prussia is to continue as part of a united German territory, it is clear that Western Prussia must also remain in her hands. If Eastern Prussia is left to Germany as a *separate* province, isolated from the Reich by Polish territory, there will be created a source of incessant conflict between Germany and Poland, for Germany will constantly endeavour to effect the junction to the detriment of Poland. If Poland is to be a really free nation, and independent of Germany, there are only two solutions to the question: either the annexation of the province of Königsberg (that part of Eastern Prussia where German is spoken) to Poland, but retaining local autonomy; or else the setting up of an independent republic bound to Poland by a customs union." (See R. Dmowski: *Polityka polska i odbudowanie Państwa* (*Polish Policy and*

the Restoration of the State), Warsaw, 1925, Annexe X, p. 606.)

The leader of Polish nationalism formulated his ideal during the war. His object was to win over President Wilson to the idea that Poland should have territorial access to the sea. In asking more than he hoped to gain in order to achieve his aim he but adopted a classic method of negotiation. Nevertheless, his idea of creating a bond between Poland and Eastern Prussia was not so much of a paradox as might appear, since the Germans of Königsberg formulated it in 1919.

And not only did the Germans do so. Colonel Th. Holdich, President, at the time, of the London Geographical Society, wrote in 1918 in his book entitled *Boundaries in Europe* (p. 137):

"It is necessary to give to Poland as frontiers the Carpathians and the Baltic Sea, and to annex to her Eastern Prussia. . . ."

Recently M. Gustave Hervé wrote in the *Victoire* of July 26, 1928:

"The difficulty cannot be disentangled. The only logical and reasonable solution would be to reunite Eastern Prussia to Poland in such a manner as to do away with the 'Corridor'. Do the Germans not wish this to be done? Very well, then, let them submit to the slight inconvenience and the mild humiliation which the Polish Corridor entails."

XIV

THE DEMAND FOR A "BALTIC SWITZERLAND"

On July 15, 1928, was held the congress of Polish refugees of Eastern Prussia. A "Federation of the People of Warmie, Mazurie, and of the Region of Malbork" (*Zrzeszenie*

Rodakow z Warmji, Mazur i Ziemi Malborskiej) was established. M. Stanislas Nowakowski, former editor-in-chief of the *Gazeta Olsztyńska* (the *Allenstein Gazette*), was elected President, and M. Paul Sowa General Secretary, of the Federation.

The following is an extract from the resolution which, according to the *Dziennik Bydgoski*, was noted by the congress:

"We see no other means of preserving the peace of Europe against the Prussian Nationalist *Maffia* than to transform Eastern Prussia, by virtue of Article 19 of the Pact of the League of Nations, into a federated Republic composed of three cantons: a German, a Polish, and a Lithuanian one. In other words, we demand the creation of a Baltic State on the model of Switzerland."

XV

AN "ISLAND" AND A "COLONY"

SPEAKING on October 25, 1928, at a meeting of the Catholic *Volksverein* of Stettin, Dr. Krone, a deputy of the Centre Party, said:

"We always speak of the Polish 'Corridor'. Have we the right to do so? Let us try and understand how the situation appears from the other side of the frontier. I have made the acquaintance of a Pole with whom I have discussed Germano-Polish relations. He did not speak of the 'Corridor', but of the 'island' that Eastern Prussia formed in the body-politic of the Polish State . . ." (*Deutsche Tageszeitung*, October 27, 1928).

Dr. Krone's friend here only stated what is self-evident. Eastern Prussia is what she has always been with reference to the bulk of German territory: an island and a colony,

in exactly the same way as are the German districts of Transylvania.

For that reason the Allies were able to write in their *Reply* on June 16, 1919:

"It is necessary to recall that during several centuries Eastern Prussia was so clearly separated that, at no time, until 1866, was she ever really included within the political frontiers of Germany; German historians have always recognized that Eastern Prussia is not a country of German origin but, rather, bears the status of a German colony" (*Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Comments of the German Delegation on the Terms of Peace*, p. 28).

XVI

TIME WORKS FOR POLAND

A PAMPHLET was published in Eastern Prussia in 1926 by the *Heimatbund* association under the title of *Die Slawische Gefahr* (*The Slav Peril*).

It asserted that the arguments used by German propagandists with regard to foreigners ought not to be taken seriously by German patriots.

"It is often said", reads the pamphlet, "that the anomalous situation of territories culturally German, which are placed under the domination of inferior peoples, cannot last, and that by force of circumstance all the treaties which are contrary to natural conditions will shortly be swept away. This is a view which it is good to spread in other countries, but Germans would be well advised to realize clearly that things will not be at all so easy. . . . As regards ourselves, not only have the territories seized from us become Polish with a rapidity that must very soon completely annul the work of Frederick II and his

successors, but even the territory which still remains German is threatened by the Slav infiltration which is taking place. . . . It is above all with regard to Eastern Prussia, isolated as it is, and with its sparse population, that the danger is formidable."

The Berlin *Lokal Anzeiger* published, on February 19, 1929, a résumé of a speech delivered by Dr. Lohmeier, the Mayor of Königsberg.

Having uttered the usual lamentations concerning the "unbearable situation" created in Eastern Prussia by the Treaty of Versailles, Dr. Lohmeier does not hide from his audience the fact that "Time is working against Germany".

Time therefore works for Poland. But it is nevertheless always necessary to give Time a helping hand.

XVII

THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN DANZIG

The Political Parties in Danzig are somewhat analogous to the German Parties, not only with regard to their platforms and their method of recruiting, but also as to their attitude towards Poland. The Nationalists of the Right are violently anti-Polish, while the Left wing would like a policy of understanding and collaboration with Poland. In Danzig this opposition shows itself with much greater clarity than in Germany, and this is very natural since economic interests bind the Free City to Poland.

The first elections in the Free City took place on June 14, 1920; their object was to elect the Constituent Assembly (*Verfassungsgebende Versammlung*) which, after voting the Constitution (on August 11, 1920), decided to continue its functions as the first ordinary *Volkstag* had done. The

normal legislative elections have already taken place twice since then: on November 9, 1923, and on November 13, 1927.

The following table shows the political complexion of the three consecutive Assemblies of the Free City of Danzig.

	1920.	1923.	1927.
Nationalists	41	33	25
Popular Party	9	6	5
Catholics	14	15	18
German-Liberals	—	—	5
National-Liberals	—	—	4
Socialists	37	30	42
Communists	3	11	8
Small Groups	9	20	10
Poles	7	5	3
Totals	120	120	120

That which is most significant in the changes that have taken place in the minds of the voters of the Free City is the continual weakening of the Danzig Nationalists, of whom the Leader is Dr. Ziehm. The effective strength of the Popular Party has also diminished, which has, without doubt, caused much cogitation, for Herr Blavier's Party now collaborates with the Socialists. The Centre Party, led by Mgr. Sawatzki, won over three seats at the laste lection, and he, too, belongs to the new Government's supporters. The German-Liberals, of whom the leaders are Herren Jewelowsky and Siebenfreund, represent those economic circles in Danzig which are favourable to friendly collaboration with Poland, whereas the National-Liberals remain sulky. The Socialists, whose numbers were

weakened in 1923 by the Communists, are the great victors of the elections of November 13, 1927; their leaders being Herren Gehl, Zint, and Kamnitzer. The Socialists thus form the basis of the coalition of the Left which has governed the Free City since January 1928.

XVIII

DANZIG BEFLAGGED IN HONOUR OF POLAND

On February 27, 1929, M. Casimir Bartel was officially welcomed by the Free City of Danzig, and the ancient city was adorned with flags in honour of the Chief of the Polish Government. Significant speeches were made at a banquet which took place in the Town Hall.

Herr Heinrich Sahm, the President of the Danzig Senate, spoke of his satisfaction at the "mutual drawing together of Poland and the Free City", a movement which had of late been making considerable progress and which he hoped would soon "reach its complete fulfilment". Herr Sahm declared that many important questions had been settled by the two parties "in an atmosphere of friendly understanding". He assured his audience that "Danzig was conscious of the important part she played in the economic life of Poland, and was ready to fulfil her task"; and that "the Government of Danzig had drawn up its programme in an earnest spirit of understanding".

M. Bartel replied that the Polish Government was ready to support and defend the rightful interests of Danzig, and that he was "firmly convinced that the economic consolidation of Danzig was indispensable to the economic development of Poland".

M. Bartel added:

"The close union of the economic interests of Poland

and of Danzig is not only the result of treaties, but also of geographical conditions, and it finds expression in Poland's policy of understanding with Danzig. In this policy of close economic co-operation with Danzig, the Polish Government also includes the firm desire to safeguard the cultural interests of the Free City and its particular national character."

At the close of his speech, M. Bartel invited the Free City "to unite her efforts with those of Poland, in conformity with a secular tradition for the maintenance of the peace and well-being of the Baltic shores".

The Danzig Press emphasized the cordial character of the speech. The Liberal *Danziger Zeitung* considered that the words of the President of the Polish Council "opened a new era in the relations between Poland and Danzig", while the Socialist *Danziger Volkestimme* wrote:

"This visit is of great political importance, for it gives striking proof of the policy of conciliation pursued by Poland and the Free City."

Alone the Nationalist *Danziger Allgemeine Zeitung* tried to lessen the favourable impression which this occasion had produced on the population of the Free City.

XIX

THE POPULATION AND THE OFFICE HOLDERS OF DANZIG

THE following is a list of High Commissioners of the League of Nations who succeeded each other at Danzig:

Sir Reginald Tower, British (January 9 to November 15, 1920);

Colonel Strutt, British (November 16 to December 15, 1920);

Sig. Bernardo Attolico, Italian (December 16, 1920, to January 23, 1921);

General Sir Richard Haking, British (January 24, 1921, to December 31, 1922);

Mr. MacDonnell, British (January 1, 1923, to February 28, 1926);

M. van Hamel, Dutch (March 1, 1926, to June 21, 1929);

Count Manfredi Gravina, Italian (June 22, 1929, to . . .).

The post of Polish High Commissioner to Danzig is filled at present by M. Henri Strasburger, former Minister of Industry and Commerce; he has had two predecessors: MM. Matthew Biesiadecki (1920) and Leon Plucinski (1921–23).

The Council of the Port and Waterways of the Free City is composed of five Poles and five members from Danzig, and is presided over by a Swiss. Its first president was Colonel James de Reynier (April 12, 1921, to February 28, 1925), and he was succeeded by Colonel Hugues de Loës.

Since June 1, 1926, the territory of the Free City has been formed into a Catholic see, the bishop of which is Mgr. Edward O'Rourke, a former apostolic administrator; while the General Superintendent of the Evangelical Church of the Free City is Herr Kalweit.

The census of November 1, 1923, showed that the Free City of Danzig numbered 366,730 inhabitants, of whom 13,656 (3·9 per cent.) were Poles. It is therefore evident that only Poles of Danzig nationality are included.

About 30 per cent. of the population of Danzig is Catholic and about 60 per cent. is Protestant.

XX

GDYNIA, "THE SWORD OF POLAND"

When Poland began the construction of the port of Gdynia, the Germans sneered and shrugged contemptuous shoulders. The task was enormous. Even Poland's sup-

porters were sceptical. Lieutenant J. Didelot considered (in 1924) that the creation of the port of Gdynia "called for such enormous labour that it could not be finished for many years" (*La Marine de l'Aigle Blanc*, Paris, Berger-Levrault, pp. 20–1). M. Louis Claudon wrote the following words about Gdynia in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of October 1, 1926:

"Vast hopes and ambitious plans presided at the birth of this young rival to Danzig; but their complete realization seems hidden in a somewhat uncertain region of the future . . ." (p. 684).

The Poles have not allowed themselves to be discouraged, and they have speedily been rewarded for their perseverance. In June 1928 several German papers—and even the *Deutsche Rio Zeitung*, published in Rio de Janeiro on the 15th—gave prominent place to an article entitled "Das Schwert Polens" ("The Sword of Poland") which dealt with the development of the port of Gdynia. If this comparison of the port to the sword is no testimonial to the literary aptitudes of its author, Herr Hoeppener, it does nevertheless express quite definitely a certain very real anxiety felt by German opinion. For in comparing a maritime outlet to a weapon, is there not a tacit acknowledgment that the outlet is a pledge of strength and of economic independence for those in whose possession it stands?

Herr Hoeppener does not hesitate to predict a brilliant future for the port:

"This port", he says, "will soon be able to compete not only with Stettin, but also with Königsberg. Without doubt Gdynia will become a great seaport. Its miniature seacoast is of inestimable value to Poland, and for that reason she has done her utmost to retain it by binding it to her hinterland by very solid economic bonds. The resulting situation makes more and more difficult the recovery by Germany of the territories that were seized from her, and, in addition, she will have to reckon with

the danger that threatens Eastern Prussia. This danger will increase in proportion to the development of the strength of Poland as a Maritime Power. . . ."

Herr Hoeppener is entirely correct. And since the Baltic coast has "an inestimable value" for Poland, how can the Germans logically assert that the present frontiers are of an "artificial" character?

But let us repeat the words of Dr. Lohmeier, "Time works for Poland". An eminent English writer, Mr. Hilaire Belloc, published an article on Gdynia in the *Nineteenth Century and After* (January 1929). He considers that "the more one knows in the West the work of Poland at Gdynia, the more the hope of a rectification of the frontiers of the 'Corridor' becomes chimerical".

XXI

MEMEL

"Give up Danzig and the 'Corridor' and you will receive in exchange Memel and Lithuania."

This "solution" was launched from official sources in Berlin during the month of May 1925. M. Camille Loutre, a careful observer, and well-informed regarding German policy, disclosed the plan in the *Gazette de Lausanne*.

In December 1926 the German Press adopted this idea from the Wilhelmstrasse. The *Berliner Börsen-Courrier* published an article on December 17, 1926, entitled "Was wird mit Litauen?" ("What of Lithuania?"), in which the following conclusion was drawn:

"The partition of Lithuania would make the solution of certain Eastern questions easy; for example, that of the Polish Corridor. . . ."

The *Hamburger Nachrichten* of December 31, 1926, asserted that:

"The peace of the East can only be assured by the suppression of Lithuania. This comic-opera state in reality hinders a Germano-Polish reconciliation."

In 1928 the German "offer" was increased. On March 31, 1928, the *Weichsel Zeitung*, a paper published at Marienwerder (East Prussia), divulged a proposal, emanating from German industrial circles, that not only should Poland receive Memel and the whole of Lithuania in exchange for the "Corridor," but also the recognition of Polish supremacy in Latvia and Esthonia, and finally . . . an alliance with Germany!

M. Georges Blun, the correspondent of the *Journal* in Berlin, asserts in his book that, in exchange for the "Corridor", Germany would offer Poland "a free port at Danzig", "freedom of transit to the sea", and neutrality as to the future of Lithuania (*L'Allemagne mise à nu*, Paris, 1928, p. 163).

On January 18, 1927, the London *Times* pronounced this plan to be "absolutely unrealizable".

XXII

OUR CONTROVERSY WITH HERR ARNOLD RECHBERG

On April 22, 1926, the *Matin* published a leading article entitled "A Bold Suggestion". Its author was Herr Arnold Rechberg, a former aide-de-camp to the Crown Prince, and a business man having interests in the German potash industry. In introducing the idea of a Franco-German alliance, Herr Rechberg laid down a series of conditions. Among them appears the following:

"Danzig and the Vistula Corridor shall be ceded to Germany; Danzig, however, shall remain a free port for Poland. In exchange, the port of Memel shall be placed at Poland's disposal. . . ."

As Herr Rechberg continued his campaign in the columns of the Paris *Avenir* and the *Phare de la Loire*, and on July 21, 1927, offered France a choice between "an industrial, military, and political alliance, close and indissoluble" and a "new war" (in the course of which Germany would this time not leave "one stone upon another in France"), we published in *L'Avenir*, on July 26th, a letter showing that Germany had no valid reason for demanding the restitution of Danzig and the "Corridor". We finished thus:

"Peace is the safeguard of existing treaties; therein lies the preservation of the territorial status of the new Europe, a status paid for in torrents of blood. The simplest and most effective method of maintaining peace is to reinforce the solidarity of those whose interests are parallel. Can it be that the solidarity of France, of Belgium, of Poland, and the Little Entente is not sufficient?"

M. Pierre Bernus showed his approval in the *Journal des Débats* (August 31, 1927) by writing:

"The ambition of Germans who reason in the manner of Herr Rechberg is without limit: in reality they would like to start by re-establishing pre-war Germany and afterwards to obtain for her the hegemony which she had hoped to obtain by war in 1914."

Herr Rechberg replied to us by a letter which was published in the *Phare de la Loire* on the 6th and in *L'Avenir* on July 7, 1927.

"International politics", he said, "have certainly never (history proves it) been based on justice. International politics concern the problems of political and economic power and of the interests of the different States. I therefore set aside as perfectly useless any discussion on questions of right, and of justice or injustice, in order that I may devote myself only to military and political facts.

"It is certain that Germany will try, as soon as opportunity arises, to retake Danzig and the Vistula Corridor

by means of a new war. If Germany should be victorious in such a war, she would also retake Poznań and Upper Silesia as well as annexing territories that actually belong to Poland.

"It is certain that a sincere reconciliation between Poland and Germany, guaranteed whole-heartedly by France in alliance with Germany, would very greatly restore the political and financial credit of Poland. Her future would be assured for centuries.

"If I were Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, I would at any time accept the following proposition:

> "Danzig and the Vistula Corridor to be given back to Germany. Equality of rights for Germans in Poland. In exchange for this, Polish integrity to be guaranteed by a Franco-German Alliance. Danzig to remain a free port for Poland and entire freedom of navigation on the Vistula to be guaranteed to Polish commerce. In addition, the port of Memel to be placed at Poland's disposal. In Upper Silesia a Polish-German industrial cartel to be set up without changing the actual frontiers between Poland and Germany. Poland further to be affiliated to the Franco-German military alliance.

"*The safeguarding of existing treaties will not lead to peace, but, on the contrary, certainly towards war at the first opportune moment. This war will, I know—in so far as human intelligence can foresee events—end in the victory of Bolshevism in all the belligerent countries. This will not prevent the war from coming if the existing treaties between France, Poland, and Germany are not modified in such a way as to reconcile the interests and satisfy the honour of the three countries.*

"Finally, I think that France could not act more loyally towards Poland than by recommending to her a solution of the question of the 'Corridor' problem which, while satisfying the interests and honour of the German people,

would at the same time greatly strengthen the economic, financial, military, and political situation of Poland and would assure to that young State a happy future."

In our reply (*L'Avenir*, July 7th) we showed why these propositions of Herr Rechberg's were unacceptable to Poland. We concluded by saying:

"Desiring at all costs to frighten us, Herr Rechberg insinuates that the Germano-Polish war with which he threatens us would be a local conflict. Far from it! Germany cannot disturb the peace whenever she likes. If she meddles at any point whatsoever with the new European order, she will start a general conflagration as in 1914; she will at the same time reunite against her the coalition which defeated her in 1918.

"In concluding his letter Herr Rechberg threatens Europe anew with the "victory of Bolshevism" if she opposes the desires of German imperialism. It is here necessary to speak plainly and to dispel the cynical ambiguity that has existed only too long.

"Bolshevism is certainly the enemy of our civilization. The Third International and the Government of the U.S.S.R. are one and the same, and will never lay down arms. The West has not only the right to defend itself against Bolshevism, but it has also the duty to fight it.

"But with what principles? By denying Right and Justice as Herr Rechberg does? By turning our backs on the undeniable spiritual and moral progress of humanity? This would be but a return to barbarism. Politics are not an end in themselves; they are, they *must* be, the instrument of a moral ideal, and the new European order came into being through the application of this principle. Whilst awaiting the time when international practice evolves to a state which makes it no longer necessary to do so, the new order is bound to defend itself by force, and it will do so should need arise. This force, placed at the service of Right, exists and is enduring.

"And by what means shall we fight Bolshevism? Herr Rechberg suggests a military expedition to Russia. But as I look upon him as being an intelligent man, I assert that his true aim is not the destruction of Bolshevism; it is above all the overthrow of the *status quo* of Central and Eastern Europe. Germany would like to disturb the peace for she cannot but gain advantage through doing so, and she would be paid in advance, at the cost of Poland and the Baltic States, for the sham service she would render Europe. Happily Herr Rechberg's magnificent plan has not found acceptance either in Paris or in London.

"The struggle against Bolshevism is above all a domestic matter for each of the civilized nations. Furthermore, there is an understanding between these nations that they shall not lend the Soviets either material or moral aid. Any other policies would be futile and disastrous, and Germany knows this.

"But if this understanding of which we speak became an anti-Bolshevist alliance, Germany would be forced to choose between the East and the West. She faces such an eventuality with uneasiness, for she prefers to have freedom to play a double part. She was represented at Geneva, but she also signed the Germano-Soviet agreement of April 24, 1926, a procedure quite incompatible with the Pact of the League of Nations.

"Herr Rechberg wishes to disguise the terms and to confuse the issues of the problem. But his labour is wasted, for his rôle of anti-Bolshevist crusader is transparent and no one will join him in it. Our generation will never see either the signing of a Franco-German alliance, or a Germano-European army saving Europe from the Red menace—and incidentally occupying the 'Corridor' never to depart from it any more."

Herr Rechberg having revived his project of a Franco-German "alliance" in the columns of the *Journal des Débats* (August 7, 1927), M. Pierre Bernus replied on the

following day with a leading article (*Grossier Machiavélisme*), in which we read the following:

"Should the day ever come when the Reich again laid a covetous hand upon Polish territory, or incorporated Austria within her realm, then the treaties that were signed as the consequence of her defeat and which have built up a new Europe very different from that in which Germany would have liked to prescribe her law, would be brought to nought. An extreme *naïveté* would be necessary in order to believe that after such success, due to the folly of her neighbours, Germany would halt on such a path. Henceforth, stronger in numbers and more powerful than in 1914, she would encircle the half of Czechoslovakia and, relying on Hungary becoming a border state of the Reich, she would become master of the whole of Central Europe.

"Thus we are not asked to conclude an alliance with a Germany accepting the *status quo* of Europe, but with a Germany that we should have first of all helped to gain all she could not obtain by the war, and who would, in this way, be able to impose her will on the whole world. Herr Rechberg is bluffing, therefore, when he suggests that in such a case Germany would have no further ambition.

"Further discussion with Herr Rechberg seems to us purposeless. He has revealed his innermost thought when he tells us that if France does not yield, Germany will attack her at the first opportunity."

On August 9, 1927, we replied again, in the columns of the *Journal des Débats*, with an explanation of the reasons why Poland will never give up the territories which are legitimately hers. In conclusion we said:

"The Germans despise all the Slavs, but especially the Poles, the most 'Latin' of the Slavs. They look upon them as an inferior people, whose land is destined to be colonized by the Germanic element. They do not question

whether the Polish nation has a right to a place in the sun, or if the frontiers drawn up are just; they feel themselves humiliated by the fact that they have been obliged to restore certain territories to the Poles.

"Nevertheless, it is essential that Germany and Poland should live side by side within their actual frontiers. It is indeed necessary that Germany should resign herself to seeing beside her a Polish State, since there is a Polish civilization as ancient as that of Germany, and since the progress of modern thought day by day grants to the Polish State a more decisive moral backing—a support which she did not possess in the eighteenth century. And, last but not least, New Poland is a power in Europe, and she is no longer alone. . . .

"The Polish nation knows that it must 'live dangerously'. If necessary, her sons will seal with their blood the unity of their country."

The discussion was carried on in the columns of *L'Œuvre* (which, on the 10th, reproduced the main points of our letter to the *Journal des Débats*) and of *L'Avenir*. On August 17th Herr Rechberg wrote:

"I believe that any future war between the great European Powers, whether between France, Poland, and Germany, or a Germano-Soviet war against England and France, will end in the triumph of Bolshevism in *all* the belligerent countries. . . ."

We replied in the same paper on August 20, 1927:

"Every one knows that, in the present state of things (a state which might last for a long time), the Soviet Union is powerless to undertake a war against anyone whomsoever; and everyone knows, at the same time, that the campaign conducted by the Bolshevist leaders in the hope of persuading the Russian people that an attack by the 'capitalist' Powers is inevitable, has for its sole object the creation of a state of mind which permits of the concealment of the failure of their régime. Herr

Rechberg, by discussing the possibility of a Franco-German military alliance (evidently directed against the Soviets since he is persuaded that it is not against England), plays into the hands of Moscow's dictators. . . .

"From a purely military point of view Moscow could easily be occupied: from the Polish frontier this could be achieved in a few days. King Sigismund III of Poland did so in 1610, and again Napoleon in 1812. But such an immense country is not held by occupying its capital, and it is impossible to occupy it in its entirety for years on end. A military expedition to Russia would therefore be a deceptive enterprise, if not a disastrous one. It would solve no problem. . . .

"As I believe Herr Rechberg to be an intelligent man, I am sure that he is aware of these facts. If he is determined at all costs to be ambiguous, it is because he has some ulterior end in view. He has decided to bring about, without taking any risks, a genuine German revenge. His tactics are simple. He exaggerates the Bolshevist danger, and then makes use of it to frighten the French and the Poles, and he does not forget to ornament his language with cynical and brutal threats after the fashion of Bismarck.

"Herr Rechberg writes too much and with little care for logic. We are in agreement when he says that 'a new world war would everywhere end in the triumph of the Soviets'. But in order to prevent this 'triumph', what does he propose? Precisely that very thing, a new war. But neither France nor England nor Poland want it.

"New Europe is capable of maintaining her existence; she is not a monster. Let her be left alone to work."

In France Herr Rechberg's propositions have received but a cold and sceptical reception. Having stated his case there, he has attempted to establish it in England. But he has not succeeded there either, and we published in *L'Avenir* of August 31, 1927, a letter clearly showing this.

"He (Herr Arnold Rechberg) has been to London twice this year", we wrote. "He went there alone in April, and he returned there in July accompanied by his elder brother Julius, by Moritz Klönne of the Rhenish Industrial Company, Herr Treviranus, the Nationalist deputy, and by Captain Hiemann, a former naval attaché to the German Embassy in London. Herr Rechberg and his friends were piloted to the banks of the Thames by Sir Alfred Mond, 'the Nickel king', former Liberal and a friend of Mr. Lloyd George, now a Conservative Member of Parliament. The only British official who received the deputation seems to have been Sir William Tyrrell.

"We do not know what the Germans discussed with the English. The London Press did not breathe a word of Herr Rechberg's activities. Two of the 'visitors' made speeches, however, but what they said was distinctly contradictory.

"On his return from London, and for the benefit of French opinion, Herr Rechberg wrote as follows in *L'Avenir* of July 21st: 'England begins to feel the need of a continental sword. *English statesmen do not believe that Poland, nor any of the other neighbour States of Soviet Russia, are strong enough to bring about the fall of Bolshevism in Russia.* . . . France is too far away . . . and the day is therefore not far off when England will use all her influence to re-establish a German army. . . .' The meaning is very clear. In London Herr Rechberg made the suggestion of a military expedition against Russia. But England certainly does not contemplate any such action. Herr Rechberg, being much attached to his ideas, seems to interpret his London conversations in very generous terms. He mistakes his wishes for realities, and, in addition, he has forgotten to come to an understanding with his fellow-traveller, Herr Treviranus.

"Indeed, the latter, who is leader of the Nationalist faction of the Reichstag, wrote in the *Boersen Zeitung* of

August 19th: '*England actually makes every possible concession to Poland. She has abandoned the plan of rallying Germany to an anti-Bolshevist standpoint.* She thus wishes to set aside the necessity of granting to Germany those concessions which run counter to Franco-Polish desires. . . .' It is evident that Herr Treviranus is the one to speak the truth.

"This attitude of British diplomacy is easily explained. Were an expedition to Russia in contemplation, a preliminary understanding with Germany would appear to be necessary. But such an expedition would be a fantastic aberration, and neither in London nor elsewhere will it ever be considered."

As conclusion let us quote from the *Journal des Débats* of September 30, 1927, in which M. Gustave Gauvain sums up a conversation which he had in Geneva with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"Herr Stresemann seemed little satisfied with the advances made by Herr Arnold Rechberg."

XXIII

GENERAL GROENER'S MEMORANDUM

THE *Review of Reviews*, edited by Mr. Henry Wickham Steed, published in its issue of January 15, 1929, a confidential report made by General Groener, the German Minister of the *Reichswehr*, to the leaders of the political parties of the Reich, on the subject of the armoured cruisers of the "A" class, the construction of which had under different circumstances already been started at the *Deutsche Werke* at Kiel, and for whose completion he demanded credit of £4,000,000, to be distributed over four years.

This report, dated November 1928, had for its purpose

the refutation of objections, raised by a large section of German opinion, against the expenditure of a very considerable sum on a matter of doubtful utility, and General Groener tried to show the necessity for armoured cruisers and for German sea-power on the Baltic, by considering two problems:

(*a*) The action to be taken in the event of a Polish attack on Eastern Prussia;

(*b*) The protection of German neutrality and interests in the event of a Polish-Russian conflict.

As Poland does not possess the requisites for constructing or repairing battleships and the Great Powers would probably not be in a position to send large cruisers to the Baltic, and as France has "her weak point and her centre of gravity in the Mediterranean", Germany, by replacing her old ships by 10,000-ton armoured cruisers of the "A" type "would, in all probability, have the upper hand of Poland in the Baltic".

In publishing this document Mr. Wickham Steed remarks that General Groener not only bases his reasoning on the considerable probability of a future war, but in addition attributes to Poland aggressive designs which it "would be folly for her to conceive".

But Poland is not mad. Having been asked to reply to General Groener in the columns of the *Review of Reviews*, M. Auguste Zaleski, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote a letter to Mr. Wickham Steed (published in the issue of February 15, 1929) in which we read as follows:

"I wish to give you, and to give English public opinion at the same time, the assurance that not only has no Polish Government ever cherished any scheme of aggression or of annexation in regard to Germany, but that I do not know of any political party or association in Poland capable of stating or of spreading such ideas. The very imputation to Poland of aggressive plans against any one of her

neighbours reveals a total misconception of the true aspirations and feelings of the Polish nation. Sorely tried by the World War and by the war against Soviet Russia, the sole aim of the Poles is the economic and cultural restoration of their country—an aim that cannot be attained save by lasting peace.

"To remove all manner of doubt on the score of I know not what Polish plans of conquest which are alleged to be directed against Germany, I can assure you that the Polish Government would be ready to conclude with Germany a treaty guaranteeing reciprocally the territorial integrity of the two States.

"In my opinion, the conclusion of such a treaty would greatly help to quiet that part of German opinion which the phantom of an alleged Polish danger has excited."

This declaration cleared up all doubtful points. As Mr. Wickham Steed observed with reason, "If German fears relative to Polish appetites are justified, the Germans could not repel an opening of this nature". "It is here a question of good faith and good will", concludes the great British journalist.

Unhappily, the bad faith of General Groener regarding this affair is only too certain. His plans are inspired by quite other motives than the defence of the Reich.

General Baron Franz von Schoenaich, who has just been elected President of the German Peace Society (*Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft*) writes in his book *Zehn Jahre Kampf für Frieden und Recht* (*Ten Years of Struggle for Peace and Justice*):

"There is no country in the whole world of which the security is more assured than that of Germany. The Polish danger in the East, of which our Nationalists never cease to speak, is only a malicious joke. The Poles wish only for peace and in no wise dream of war with us."

XXIV

GERMAN NATIONALIST AIMS

SOME time ago the headquarters of the Austro-German Volksbund (*Oesterreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund*, 40, Schloss Bellevue, Berlin, N.W.) edited and distributed in Germany, Austria, and among the groups who constitute the German minorities in foreign countries, hundreds of thousands of copies of a map whose title bore the legend, "This ought all to be Germany" (*Das ganze Deutschland soll es Sein*).

This map, on which Germany and Austria are represented in red, with the boundaries as they were settled by the treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain, clearly shows the extent of "Integral Germany" (*Gesamtdeutschland*) by having it broadly outlined in black.

The Pan-Germanists are not satisfied with clamouring for the reunion of Austria to Germany (*Anschluss*). They also demand:

(1) The territory of Memel, at Lithuania's expense;

(2) The Free City of Danzig, Polish Pomerania, Poznań, and Polish Upper Silesia, at Poland's expense;

(3) The whole of Teschen Silesia, at the expense of Poland and Czechoslovakia;

(4) The whole of the frontier regions of Czechoslovakia which are inhabited by German minorities;

(5) The part of Bürgenland belonging to Hungary;

(6) The region of Maribor (Marburg), or Lower Styria, at the expense of Jugoslavia;

(7) Tarvis and the area of Upper Adige (South Tyrol), at Italy's expense;

(8) Alsace-Lorraine, at France's expense;

(9) The whole of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg;

(10) The regions of Eupen and Malmédy, at Belgium's expense;

*

(11) Slesvig in the north, at Denmark's expense.

Switzerland alone is spared, although on the map of the *Volksbund* the parts of Switzerland where German is spoken (*deutsch-sprachige Schweiz*) are indicated.

It must thus be concluded from this document that there is not a country bordering on the Reich that may not to some extent be affected by the senseless claims of Pan-Germanism.

XXV

EX-COMBATANTS AND THE "CORRIDOR"

On September 10 and 11, 1928, an International Congress of ex-combatants was held in Luxemburg. The largest associations of France, Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Poland, Belgium, Germany, Austria, and yet other countries were represented.

The Germans wished the Congress to discuss the question of the "Corridor". The Polish delegation, presided over by the author, refused, pointing out the definite character of the Polish frontiers. But it accepted the following procedure: that a German should explain the point of view of his delegation, and that a Pole should reply; but that there should not be a discussion and that the question should not be put to the vote.

M. Léo Gerville-Réache, the special correspondent of the *Matin*, reported this debate in the issue of September 12th in the following terms:

"This morning before all the assembled delegates, we were given the opportunity of witnessing a rather curious spectacle. Two speakers, a German and a Pole, were allowed to explain their two opposing points of view on the burning question of the Polish 'Corridor'.

"Herr August Abel, a delegate of the Order of Young Germans, brought the question before the Congress. With

the help of history and of statistics he endeavoured to show that the Danzig 'Corridor' was German. Herr Abel ended his energetic plea with this warning:

" '*As representative of an organization which has inscribed loyalty in the forefront of its banners, I do assure you most solemnly that we are doing our utmost to put an end to the tragic atrophy of Eastern Germany and to do away with the unbearable situation which exists to-day on our Eastern frontier. This situation threatens the peace of Europe in the most serious fashion and the Order of Young Germans considers it its duty to show you this in all frankness.*'

"It was M. Casimir Smogorzewski who, in a very fine and no less energetic statement, replied to the arguments of the German delegation.

"He recalled that the territories of the Danzig Corridor were historically Polish and that the inhabitants are of Polish race. He also recalled this remark of Bismarck's: 'For a Polish State having Warsaw as a capital, the possession of Danzig would be a necessity still more imperious than the possession of Poznania.'

"He showed that the economically invisible frontiers of the 'Corridor' caused little inconvenience to transit between the Reich and Eastern Prussia, and he emphasized that, thanks to Poland, Danzig is the only port in the world which has quadrupled its pre-war traffic.

"He ended his speech by quoting the words of M. Zaleski:

" 'Poland refuses to buy neighbourly relations at the price of revised frontiers. Pomerania alone assures her free access to the sea. Every Pole would sacrifice life and fortune to defend this territory against any attempt, from whatsoever direction it might come.'

"The Conference listened to both sides and kept silence, but it seemed as if the second speaker was particularly commended."

Let us add that the London *Review of Reviews* published

in its issue of October 1928 long summaries of the two arguments, whereas *Der Jungdeutsche*, the daily organ of the Order of the Young Germans, inserted in its issue of September 16, 1928, the Polish statement *in extenso*, accompanying it by a curt refutation drawn up by Herr Kurt Pastenaci.

XXVI

MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN THE POLISH "CORRIDOR", 1929

In October 1929 Municipal Elections were held in 33 towns of the Province of Pomerania, i.e. in the so-called Polish Corridor, which resulted in the election of 630 Polish councillors by 83,247 votes, and of 72 German councillors by 11,223 votes. In 1926 the number of Polish votes amounted to 62,150, while that of the German votes to 9,053.

The results of the elections in the eight principal towns were as follows (October 1929).

Toruń (capital) ..	38 Poles	4 Germans
Grudziadz	35 „	7 „
Tczew	24 „	6 „
Gdynia	18 „	0 „
Starogard	26 „	4 „
Wejherowo	17 „	7 „
Chelmno	34 „	2 „
Chojnice	23 „	7 „

In twelve other towns not one single German was elected to the Municipal Council.

The German minority voted everywhere with its usual discipline and solidarity for one all-German list, while the vote of the Polish majority was split between as many as seven or even eight different parties. The number of Poles

who abstained from voting was considerably higher, amounting to 40 per cent., whilst that of the Germans vacillated between 10 per cent. and 20 per cent. Nevertheless the above figures show quite clearly that in no town of Pomerania did the Germans constitute even one-third of the population, and in many cases there were no Germans at all. In some of the above-mentioned 33 towns (Golub, Sempolno, Wiecbork) the elections were not held at all, as there was only one Polish-German list, and its candidates were returned unopposed. This again is an instance of increasing co-operation between Poles and Germans, which, but for outside interference, would soon become general throughout the province.

It may be added that earlier elections, notably the two General Elections for Parliament of 1922 and 1928, and the Municipal Elections of 1926, showed exactly the same relative proportion of the Germans, and consequently can be accepted as conclusive as far as the two races are concerned.

XXVII

SIR ROBERT DONALD'S CASE AGAINST POLAND

SHORTLY after this book was published in French there appeared in English a book entitled *The Polish Corridor and the Consequences*, by Sir Robert Donald. It is to be regretted that the book cannot be regarded as a serious contribution to the study of the subject owing to the extremely partisan standpoint adopted by the author. The following extracts from competent reviews of Sir Robert Donald's book may be usefully recorded here:

Economist, August 24, 1929.

". . . A very short examination of Sir Robert Donald's latest book is enough to dispel the hope that the very real need for a dispassionate and objective study of the situation

on the Polish-German frontier was at last being satisfied. Sir Robert, whose association with Lord Rothermere seems to have led him into strange paths, has followed up a book that was, in effect, a sustained attack on Czechoslovakia with another that is, in effect, a sustained attack on Poland. Whatever credit may be given to the author for the desire which no doubt animated him to see both sides and state them fairly, it remains true that there is hardly a page of this book that a professional German propagandist would have written differently.

No appreciation of Polish-German relations carried out in that spirit can contribute much either to public enlightenment, or to the general pacification which Sir Robert Donald must desire as much as anyone. . . . There are, moreover, several passages in this volume in which a seriously misleading impression is conveyed, either because material facts are omitted, or because the facts that are related are related inaccurately. . . .

These quotations are sufficient to show how unsafe a guide Sir Robert Donald can be over ground uniformly difficult and deceptive. All the problems he discusses are of the first importance, and many of them, like the action of the Poles in constructing the Port of Gdynia on purely Polish territory, a few miles from Danzig, raise economic and political issues of considerable interest. But here, again, Sir Robert confines himself to what may be termed the case against the Poles, and shows no sign of having grasped or appreciated the motives—quite possibly, on balance, inadequate motives—which led Poland to decide that she must have an outlet on indisputably Polish soil instead of putting the whole of her reliance on Danzig."

The Times Literary Supplement, July 25, 1929.

". . . while he tells us that was wrong, we have no creative suggestions as to what should have been done, or should

now be done, unless it is—and this seems to be the real moral of the book—that practically everything taken away from Germany should be restored to her; then we shall get satisfaction and contentment. He does not seem to realize that the difficulties were inherent in the situation itself; that no solution satisfactory to everyone was possible, and that what he seems to think were foolish and often dishonest compromises were a sober and serious attempt to do that which was fairest and best to all; and he does not appear to understand that the chance of a successful and permanent peace being established is made infinitely more difficult by those who, with the best will in the world, repeat every ground of criticism, declaring that the thing is unjust, and thereby encourage the forces of unrest and discontent on the Continent itself.

". . . one feels throughout that in the author's mind the loss or inconvenience to Poland or to Lithuania is negligible, that to Germany serious. It is a point of view common enough, and has this to be said for it, that, as Germany is much bigger and more powerful than Lithuania and Poland, in the long run peace will probably be best secured by giving her what she wants, whether justly or unjustly.

". . . The statistics do not seem in all cases reliable; it is certainly not the case that Danzig has to contribute £44,000 a year to the payment of office expenses of the High Commissioner, and Sir Robert tends very much to exaggerate the injury done to East Prussia by the existence of the corridor. When he speaks of the partition of East and West Prussia which had for centuries been one trading community connecting main routes of trade, he is entirely ignoring the fact that until a little over a hundred years ago East and West Prussia had always been under separate and hostile sovereignties, and in fact such interruption on the lines of communication as has been caused by the existence of the corridor is nothing compared with the difficulties of transit in the older days."

Manchester Guardian, August 21, 1929.

"In this volume Sir Robert Donald continues his campaign against the territorial provisions of the Paris settlement. . . . Sir Robert, who, while nobly endeavouring to be fair, actually expounds with considerable ability the moderate German view, forgets that justice and common sense appeal in the abstract to nations no more than to individuals, and that any revision which is common sense and just to one automatically becomes foolish and unjust to another. His solution, ably set forth, of a complicated revision bristling with concessions and involving a conception of a Silesia in economic union with Germany, and having free trade with Poland is not a solution at all."

G.K.'s Weekly, July 20, 1929.

"Sir Robert Donald will inform opinion all the more easily because he has an English title and a Scotch name. If he were known to be a German or a Polish propagandist, his arguments might be open to suspicion. What is more, he has already been described by his publishers as an impartial writer. He has already been accepted by the critics, and praised by them, as an impartial writer. He has visited the Corridor, he has gone into the literature of his subject, he is an outside observer without prejudice one way or the other. That is the theory. And so it is a responsibility to say of a book which has been baited for English opinion and has caught the fish, that it is unhistorical, inaccurate, incomplete, often irrelevant, heavily biased in favour of Germany, and subtle in its implications against the Poles. But it is all astonishingly well done.

". . . If it had not been praised as impartial, this volume on the Polish Corridor, with irrelevant discussions on Vilna and Upper Silesia, would not be sufficiently important to review."

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